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ABSTRACT
Municipalities have historically enjoyed immense stability. This
era of tranquility is over, and fiscal deterioration is accelerating.
Policymakers and scholars have struggled to formulate debt restruc-
turing options; almost all have embraced federal bankruptcy law.
But this resource-draining process is not the fulcrum point for any
meaningful solution to municipal demise. Indeed, for the vast
majority of distressed municipalities, the lever of municipal recovery
will not turn on the solutions that have been offered to date. This
Article radically shifts the municipal recovery debate by arguing that
state law is the centralized point at which officials can exert the nec-
essary amount of pressure to gain concessions from key creditor con-
stituencies. To that end, I propose a comprehensive fiscal monitoring
system that identifies and then directs distressed municipalities into
a dynamic negotiation model designed to restructure inveterate debt
obligations. Animating this proposal is a more nuanced understand-
ing of the Contracts Clause that allows a municipality to explore
unilateral contract modification in an effort to facilitate consensual
agreements with creditor constituencies.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 16, 1975, Hugh Carey, then governor of New York,
was attending an event at the Waldorf Astoria when one of his aides
approached and informed him that he was needed at his midtown
office.1 No further explanation was necessary. Carey promptly left
the event as if he had been summoned to a loved one’s deathbed.2
And, in some ways, he had. New York City was facing its financial
death.
When Carey entered his office, he discovered that the city did not
have sufficient funds to meet its payroll and other obligations that
would come due the next day.3 City and state officials were working
frantically to secure additional funds.4 Abraham Beame, then mayor
of New York City, had called the White House and asked to plead
his case to President Gerald Ford.5 Beame was told that Ford was
sleeping, but, rest assured, his staff was monitoring New York City’s
situation.6
The White House was well aware of New York City’s impending
demise. City leaders planted the seeds of the city’s death spiral in
the 1960s when they removed barriers to the growth of its payrolls
and social programs and financed the city’s largesse with excessive
borrowing.7 From 1961 to 1975, municipal employees unionized and
labor costs increased 313%.8 During the same period, spending on
social welfare programs increased over 828%.9 City residents en-
joyed free tuition at the City University of New York and subsidized
fares on the mass-transit system.10 City officials lacked the fortitude
and political capital to curtail spending; bloated social programs had
1. See SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN & ROBERT POLNER, THE MAN WHO SAVED NEW YORK:
HUGH CAREY AND THE GREAT FISCAL CRISIS OF 1975, at 140 (2011).
2. See id.
3. See id. 
4. See id. at 142. State budget officials had suggested that the city issue IOUs. Id.
5. See id. at 140.
6. See id.
7. See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS/FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
NEW YORK CITY 106 (1985).
8. Id. at 116.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 140.
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been overfed for years and could not be weaned.11 For the decade
prior to the city’s financial crisis, local officials had allowed expenses
to increase by an average of 12% every year while tax revenues in-
creased only 4-5%.12 Consequently, New York City had to borrow
billions of dollars through the municipal credit markets to cover this
budgetary shortfall.13 By 1975, the city had an operating deficit of
more than $3 billion,14 but made no attempt to curtail spending.
Instead, city officials obfuscated the impending crisis with an array
of accounting gimmicks that covertly saddled the city with debt that
it had little chance to service.15
Fearing the worst, Mayor Beame had his staff draft a press re-
lease that read, “I have been advised by the comptroller that the
City of New York has insufficient cash on hand to meet debt obliga-
tions due today. This constitutes the default that we have struggled
to avoid.”16 However, the press release was never distributed.17 In
the face of this unprecedented cataclysm, state officials were able to
obtain funds from an unlikely source. Albert Shanker, the president
of the New York City teachers’ union, reluctantly agreed to transfer
$453 million from the Teachers’ Retirement System into the city’s
coffers in exchange for city bonds.18 This act delayed the city’s de-
fault, but it did not save the patient. The prospect of the city failing
was still very real.
In the months that followed, officials implemented a plan that
ultimately allowed the city to avoid a federal bankruptcy filing
and heal its financial wounds. The state created the Municipal
Assistance Corporation of the City of New York (MAC) to issue new
municipal debt.19 State legislators agreed to provide a 28% increase
11. Id. at 116.
12. Id. 
13. Id.
14. Id. at 106. The shortfall would be approximately $13 billion in today’s dollars. 
15. These gimmicks included “revenue accruals, capitalization of expenses, raiding re-
serves, appropriation of illusory fund balances, suspension of payments, carry-forward of def-
icits, and questionable receivables.” PAUL M. HEALY, HARVARD BUS. SCH. CASE STUDY, THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 4 (2000); see SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 106.
16. LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 1, at 143.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 144.
19. See ROGER DUNSTAN, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, NO. CRB-V3-N01, OVERVIEW OF NEW
YORK CITY’S FISCAL CRISIS 4 (1995), http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/95/notes/v3n1.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2TTQ-9NKA]. In return, the city was required to implement a variety of austerity
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in intergovernmental aid.20 Bondholders deferred debt and interest
payments on bonds, and various banks provided additional financ-
ing.21 Congress passed the New York City Loan Guarantee Act of
1978 that offered $2.3 billion of short-term loans to New York City.22
Perhaps most importantly, municipal employees accepted short-
term pay cuts and layoffs and allowed pension funds to be invested
in new MAC debt.23
In the years since New York City’s brush with financial collapse,
American municipalities24 have enjoyed relative stability. Since
1954, only sixty-three municipalities with taxing authority sought
protection under Chapter 9.25 But this era of tranquility has ended.
Municipalities have begun to experience the same financial inferno
that started to consume our national economy in 2008. Tax revenue
is declining.26 Healthcare costs are escalating and eclipsing reve-
nue growth.27 Unfunded liabilities for state and municipal retirees’
healthcare benefits amount to more than $1 trillion.28 Pension sys-
tems are underfunded by as much as $4.4 trillion.29 These burdens
measures. The city was obligated to raise fees for city services, including the cost of public
transit, impose tuition at city universities, cut a variety of city services, decrease the city’s
work force by 25,000 employees, reverse wage increases, raise taxes, fully fund pension plans,
and balance its budget by 1978. See SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 134-35.
20. See SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 137.
21. DUNSTAN, supra note 19, at 5-6.
22. Id. at 5.
23. See HEALY, supra note 15, at 4.
24. For purposes of this paper, the terms “municipality” and “municipalities” describe
counties, cities, and other local governments that enjoy taxing authority.
25. See James Spiotto, Chapter 9 and Alternatives—Part One: Lessons Learned: An Update
on the Municipal Bankruptcy Experience, MUNINET GUIDE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.
muninetguide.com/articles/chapter-9-and-alternatives---part-one-lessons-learned-an-upd-733
[http://perma.cc/TJH4-EJQJ]. In fact, since 1954, only 318 entities have sought protection
under Chapter 9. Id. The vast majority of these filings were by utility, water, and other spe-
cial districts that generally manage one discrete social service and have no taxing authority.
See id.
26. See RICHARD RAVITCH & PAUL A. VOLCKER, STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, REPORT
OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE: SUMMARY REPORT 2 (2012), http://www.
statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-
Force-Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/G5ZP-4C2M].
27. See id. at 1-2.
28. See id. at 2.
29. See Stuart Buck, The Legal Ramifications of Public Pension Reform, 17 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 25, 27 (2012); see also Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Crisis in Local
Government Pensions in the United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR RETIREMENT AND
INSTITUTIONAL MONEY MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 47, 48 (Yasuyuki Fuchita
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fall on the state as well as all municipalities located within its
borders. Not surprisingly, twenty-eight municipalities have declared
bankruptcy or become subject to a receivership since late 2008, and
five of the six largest municipal bankruptcies in American history
are in this group.30 Amidst this bloodshed, experts have predicted an
even larger tidal wave of financial distress for municipalities in the
upcoming years.31 The scope of this problem is far broader than
many would suspect. Systemic municipal failure is a multi-tiered
problem with ripple effects, because fiscally crippled municipalities
impose significant economic costs on state and national economies.32
Academics and policymakers have struggled to propose viable
solutions to the staggering financial problems facing municipali-
ties. Up to this point, the literature has focused on federal bank-
ruptcy law and the options available under Chapter 9.33 In particu-
lar, scholars have argued that Chapter 9 bankruptcy judges need
more power and municipal debtors need more weapons in their
arsenal to address crippling union obligations and bond debt.34
Politicians and scholars have made a variety of suggestions, and
some have gone so far as to suggest amending the Constitution to
allow states to seek federal bankruptcy protection.35
et al. eds., 2011) (assessing the unfunded liability for government pension plans at $3 trillion).
30. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1120
(2014). 
31. See Maria Chutchian, Out-of-Court Municipal Restructuring Will Rise, Experts
Say, LAW360 (Feb. 7, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/508223/out-of-court-
municipal-restructuring-will-rise-experts-say [http://perma.cc/Z86F-G4DZ].
32. See RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 17-18.
33. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can Munic-
ipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?,  27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 372
(2011); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012); Thomas Moers Mayer, State Sovereignty, State
Bankruptcy, and a Reconsideration of Chapter 9, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 363, 365-66 (2011); Juliet
M. Moringiello, Specific Authorization to File Under Chapter 9: Lessons from Harrisburg, 32
CAL. BANKR. J. 237 (2012); Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and
Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45,
47 (2011).
34. See Gillette, supra note 33, at 315-28; Trotter, supra note 33, at 47.
35. See Mayer, supra note 33, at 369, 385; Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach
to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011); David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012); Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt: States Need
a New Way to Deal with Budget Crises, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at A19; Mary Williams
Walsh, A Path Is Sought for States to Escape Their Debt Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011,
at A1; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?,
228 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:221
Federal bankruptcy law, however, is not the fulcrum point for any
meaningful solution to municipal financial distress. The lever of mu-
nicipal recovery will not turn by implementing the solutions already
proposed. Indeed, the literature fails to appreciate that Chapter 9
is a resource-draining process that perpetuates cost shifting, fails to
produce needed structural changes, yields poorly formed results,
and raises borrowing costs that further burden future generations.
This Article radically shifts the municipal recovery debate by
eschewing federal bankruptcy law and proposing that state law can
be the centralized point at which officials exert the necessary
amount of pressure to gain concessions from unions and bondhold-
ers. I seek to reframe our solution inquiry through the prism of a
state debt adjustment mechanism. My proposal is premised on a
comprehensive fiscal monitoring system coupled with a clear debt
negotiation structure for distressed municipalities. Animating my
proposal is a more nuanced understanding of the Contracts Clause
that allows a municipality to explore unilateral contract modifica-
tion of key obligations in an effort to facilitate consensual agree-
ments with creditor constituencies.
Ultimately, my proposal seeks to (1) identify pressured municipal-
ities at a time when measured adjustments can be sufficient to
create sustainable viability, and (2) shepherd distressed municipali-
ties through a dynamic negotiation structure in an effort to capture
Chapter 9’s primary benefits without the accompanying costs,
inefficiencies, and constitutional quandaries.
Part I addresses the challenges subnational governments face. I
detail how perverse incentives, cost shifting, and borrower oppor-
tunism have created oversized long-term costs that cannot be
addressed by traditional debt alleviation methods. In Part II, I pro-
vide a brief overview of some of the more aggressive debt restructur-
ing methods that exist at the state and federal level and analyze the
deficiencies of the available options. In Part III, I plot the path for-
ward and define the contours of my uniform state debt adjustment
system. I explore the goals and benefits of my system and argue
that the most effective debt adjustment mechanism is one that fa-
cilitates negotiation and incentivizes parties to make meaningful
50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1064-66 (2013); David E. Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surviving a Tenth
Amendment Challenge, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 217, 217-21 (2012).
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concessions. Current restructuring options rely exclusively on court
adjudication, which drains resources and offers nominal benefits. In
this Part, I also reanalyze the Contracts Clause and similar pro-
visions that appear in state constitutions. This analysis explores the
forgotten exceptions to the Contracts Clause that serve as a basis
for allowing distressed municipalities to impose unilateral contrac-
tual modification on creditors. The threat of such alterations will
encourage creditors to make meaningful concessions and facilitate
consensual agreements.
Finally, Part IV presents my normative approach in full. I pro-
pose a uniform state debt adjustment mechanism in which dis-
tressed municipalities pass through up to five stages to achieve
sustainable viability. The system provides a panoply of benefits.
Primarily, I propose early intervention by state officials; this in-
tercession improves the odds of a successful result by addressing
local officials’ temptation to repeatedly defer meaningful rehabilita-
tive steps. Further, my system gradually escalates state involve-
ment, which respects the municipality’s democratic integrity but
recognizes that reversing devolution is appropriate during fiscal
emergencies. A control board is ultimately vested with key decision-
making power, but only after local officials are given sufficient time
to avert a crisis. The board will lead negotiations with unions and
bondholders, acting aggressively if a true emergency exists, and
relying on my novel perspective on the Contracts Clause in order to
encourage constituents to negotiate consensual modifications to
municipal obligations. The final stage in the system demands that
the distressed municipality either achieve a meaningful restructur-
ing for sustainability or seek federal bankruptcy court protection.
My system precludes state and federal bailouts, thereby minimizing
moral hazard risk on the part of municipalities and lenders.
A second wave of financial turmoil is approaching our nation’s
subnational governments.36 Many of these governments cannot
withstand this pernicious assault. States have long ignored this
problem, and all but a few offer no meaningful restructuring
options.37 Scholars and policymakers have impulsively embraced
36. See Chutchian, supra note 31.
37. See James E. Spiotto, The Role of the State in Supervising and Assisting Municipal-
ities, Especially in Times of Financial Distress, 34 MUN. FIN. J. 1, 11-12 (2013), http://www.
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Chapter 9.38 I acknowledge that federal bankruptcy law is a nec-
essary consideration for municipalities facing failure, but it is a
tertiary solution. Unlike any article to date, this Article proposes a
detailed state debt adjustment system premised on a comprehensive
negotiation structure that seeks consensual contractual modifica-
tion, not resource-draining litigation.
I. CHALLENGES FACING MUNICIPALITIES
A. Overview39
The Great Recession of 2008 did not cause the systemic problems
undermining the nation’s municipal landscape; it merely exposed
them.40 The true extent of municipal destabilization was not clear
until recently. Indeed, at the turn of this decade, municipalities41
were able to rely on intergovernmental aid to bolster their balance
sheets.42 Intergovernmental aid includes grants, transfers, and oth-
er funds a municipality receives from federal, state, county, or other
local governments through ongoing revenue-sharing agreements
and one-time infusions.43 The American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA)44 was signed in 2009 as a short-term stimulus bill
chapmanstrategicadvisors.com/media/publication/1_Role_of_State_Supervising_Assisting_
Municipalities_in_Distress_%202011_MFJ_csa.pdf [http://perma.cc/838U-Q4D9].
38. See Anderson, supra note 30, at 1131. But see Spiotto, supra note 37, at 5.
39. Municipal deterioration has been thoroughly chronicled, and a variety of scholars are
ably handling the articulation of this phenomenon. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 30;
Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated with
Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die ... And How They Are Killing Cities
Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 816 (2014). A full exploration of this issue is beyond
this Article’s scope, but a general overview is instructive.
40. See Anderson, supra note 30, at 1130 n.22.
41. As noted above, for purposes of this Article, the terms “municipality” and “munic-
ipalities” describe counties, cities, and other local governments that enjoy taxing authority.
See supra note 24.
42. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., AMERICA’S BIG CITIES IN VOLATILE TIMES: MEETING
FISCAL CHALLENGES AND PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 4 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/Assets/2013/11/11/AmericasBigCitiesinVolatileTimes.pdf [http://perma. cc/452D-JHCV]
[hereinafter AMERICA’S BIG CITIES].
43. See id. at 10.
44. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(codified in scattered sections of 6, 19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.).
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seeking to infuse $787 billion into the economy.45 A significant
portion of these funds represented direct aid to states, funds that
often times went to municipalities.46 Funding through the ARRA
helped stabilize localities for a brief period of time, but the ARRA
and other measures have merely served to delay the day of reckon-
ing. By 2010, state aid to municipalities decreased by $12.6 billion
from the previous year and decreased again in 2011, 2012, and
2013.47
Declining intergovernmental aid has been compounded by declin-
ing property tax collections.48 Property tax revenue had been a stal-
wart for municipalities during previous economic downturns.49 But
the imploding housing market precipitated the Great Recession, and
an unprecedented fall in home prices decimated county coffers.50
Between 2007 and 2011, home prices fell almost 20% nationally, hit-
ting states like Arizona and Nevada harder.51
Today, unfortunately, revenues are declining while costs are
rising. City and municipal budgets face rising labor costs in the form
of salaries and wages,52 as well as pensions and daunting employee-
related costs for long-term health care for retired employees.53 In
45. See The Recovery Act, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/arra/About/Pages/The_
Act.aspx#act [http://perma.cc/DTN9-SFTE] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).
46. See ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICAN
RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009, CHAPTER 1: THE YEAR IN REVIEW (2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/20100216-annual-report-progress-recovery-
act.pdf [http://perma.cc/BKX9-UAC2]. In fact, states have historically funded on average close
to one-third of local budgets. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE LOCAL SQUEEZE: FALLING
REVENUES AND GROWING DEMAND FOR SERVICES CHALLENGE CITIES, COUNTIES, AND SCHOOL
DISTRICTS 5-6 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2012/ 06/Pew_Cities_Local-
Squeeze_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/8WJN-49EY] [hereinafter THE LOCAL SQUEEZE] (“Many
states provide grants [to localities] for general operations; in other cases, money is set aside
for certain uses, such as road repair. States also sometimes share a portion of tax revenues
with cities, counties, and school districts based on factors like population, need, and the
community’s existing tax burden.”).
47. See THE LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 46, at 4. In 2011, Nebraska cancelled all funding
to cities and counties, and in Maryland, state aid to counties and municipalities dropped 60%
from 2007 to 2012. See id. at 7.
48. See id. at 8-9.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 9.
51. See id. at 9-10.
52. Municipalities spend more than 35% of their budget expenditures on salaries and
wages. See id. at 13; see also RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 10, 12.
53. See MICHAEL A. PAGANO & CHRISTINA MCFARLAND, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES,
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fact, health benefit costs and pension costs have steadily increased
for the vast majority of municipalities54 and will continue to rise for
the foreseeable future.55 Unfunded liabilities for state and munic-
ipal retirees’ healthcare benefits amount to more than $1 trillion.56
Pension systems are underfunded by as much as $4.4 trillion.57
Further, as the Great Recession unfolded, demand spiked for the
free services that municipalities provide, particularly health and hu-
man services and public safety.58 Municipalities fund public welfare
programs that provide “cash or food assistance, healthcare, low-
income housing, and workforce development.”59 From 2007 to 2010,
the number of Americans in poverty increased 14%, increasing the
demands for services provided by municipalities.60
B. Perverse Incentives and Cost Shifting
Many distressed municipalities are suffering from self-inflicted
wounds.61 The systemic problems noted above are invariably the
product of perverse incentives that have produced cost shifting over
the course of decades.
To understand the practice of cost shifting, it is important to
consider resource allocation. Municipalities engage in efficient
resource allocation when public officials fully internalize all ben-
efits and costs of public action.62 Undervaluing benefits—or over-
valuing costs—will cause public officials to provide too little of the
public services in demand. Overvaluing benefits—or undervaluing
RESEARCH BRIEF ON AMERICA’S CITIES: CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 2013, at 5 (2013), http://
www.nlc.org/Documents/Find%20City%20Solutions/Research%20Innovation/Finance/Final_
CFC2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/S9U4-S4QX].
54. See id. at 5-6. 
55. See RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 43-44.
56. See id. at 43.
57. See Buck, supra note 29, at 27; see also Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 29, at 48. For
example, Illinois’s pension fund is underfunded by an estimated $187 billion, which is 318%
of the state’s total revenues. See Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 29, at 48.
58. See THE LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 46, at 14.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. I acknowledge that there are municipalities that are suffering due to macro shifts in
the national and subnational economies. 
62. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1072-74 (1983).
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costs—will lead to indulgence. But overarching this entire premise
are the fundamental perverse incentives that plague political ac-
tors in a public choice paradigm. More specifically, many local
officials are incentivized to overvalue benefits and undervalue costs;
to essentially “overgraze” at the debt commons.63 For example,
states attempt to limit their municipalities’ debt load, but munici-
palities have historically been able to avoid key aspects of these
limitations.64 Indeed, large municipalities have adopted a model
dependent on access to the credit markets.65 Approximately 44,000
subnational governments issue debt.66 The municipal bond market
approaches $4 trillion in principal, and there are “over one million
different municipal bonds outstanding compared to fewer than
50,000 different corporate bonds.”67
Municipal debt is used primarily to fund capital improvement
projects,68 which include all construction, renovation, improvement,
fabrication, and customization projects within a municipality’s bor-
ders.69 Infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and dams
represent capital improvement projects. These improvements pro-
vide myriad short-term benefits in the form of new jobs and
appreciable resource allocation, generally enhancing civic pride.70
But they can also create long-term fixed obligations, and debt ser-
vice generally escalates over time. The burden of servicing the debt
associated with these projects rarely falls on the officials that
initially authorized the expenditure and attendant borrowing.71
Managing the costs instead falls to future local officials and resi-
dents. And, in some cases, the burden extends to state officials and
nonresidents. This practice is cost shifting.72
63. See Gillette, supra note 33, at 287-88.
64. See, e.g., Spiotto, supra note 37, at 8.
65. See id. at 3.
66. See Amicus Curiae Brief by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Ass’n at
6, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 12, 2014). 
67. See id. at 7.
68. See NEIL O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 5 (6th ed. 2012).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Gillette, supra note 33, at 291-92.
72. See Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with
Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35, 38-39 (Jonathan Rodden et al. eds., 2003).
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Cost shifting is easily identifiable in the context of borrowing, but
it also characterizes labor negotiations. Local officials frequently
avoid strikes and other work stoppages by offering unions benefits
that accrue at some point in the distant future. This is another facet
of cost shifting’s pervasive effect. For example, in 1996 the City of
San Diego was facing a budget gap.73 City officials sought to address
this shortfall by diverting funds earmarked for employee retirement
accounts.74 In order to gain the necessary consent from employee
unions, city officials agreed to increase benefits to current and re-
tired employees.75 Employees benefitted because they received in-
creased benefits,76 and the city was still responsible for fully funding
retirement benefits. City officials benefitted because they were
allowed to underfund the employee retirement system, gaining
immediate cash savings and avoiding difficult spending cuts.77 Also,
the increased benefits awarded to city employees accrued over time
and did not create an immediate burden on the city’s budget. The
city officials that arranged this deal captured the short-term bene-
fits.78 Unfortunately, the consequences of these actions are being felt
by the city today. Current city officials are being forced to make
unpopular spending cuts to address underfunded retirement
accounts.79 Current residents are facing diminished services and
additional taxes due to resources being diverted to rectify the under-
funding.80 These parties are bearing the cost of past indiscretions.81
73. See Vladimir Kogan, Pension Crisis: Poor Investment Decisions Are to Blame, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/apr/24/poor-
investment-decisions-are-to-blame/ [http://perma.cc/R7TZ-JPA5].
74. See id.
75. See Jennifer Vigil, ’96 Memo Details Pension Strategy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June





79. See Dan Fitzpatrick, San Diego Pension Dials up the Risk to Combat a Shortfall, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/san-diego-pension-dials-up-the-risk-to-
combat-a-shortfall-1407974779 [http://perma.cc/R88G-9GKE].
80. See Steven Greenhut, Pension Effort Faces More than Unions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/mar/18/pension-sacramento-reform-
initiative-union-wrath/ [http://perma.cc/3WDB-DRM5].
81. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 79.
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Cost shifting has proliferated across the country, contributing to
the severe financial distress that exists at the subnational govern-
ment level.
C. The Elusive Nature of Resource Adjustment
Distressed municipalities have attempted to effectuate resource
adjustment in order to address budgetary shortfalls, but the results
have been disheartening. Municipalities are ill-equipped to create
new revenue streams to combat financial distress.82 Forty-six states
severely limit a municipality’s ability to increase taxes.83 There are
also political obstacles. Elected officials are prone to eschew tax
increases in favor of less controversial revenue-generating mea-
sures, such as raising fees that are applied to city services.84 But
these fee increases often fail to generate significant funds. Even in
states that give municipalities the option of increasing taxes, the
imposition of higher taxes may only serve to reduce the tax base.
Indeed, macro migration trends demonstrate that the U.S. popula-
tion is becoming more diffused.85 This trend shrinks tax bases in
affected areas. And tax increases arguably accelerate this trend and
eviscerate the benefit of a tax increase.
Attempts to reduce employee-related expenses have also been
ineffective. Collective bargaining agreements severely limit adjust-
ments to employee headcount and benefits. Municipalities invari-
ably wind up making minor reductions in headcount that produce
minimal cost savings.86 Hiring freezes are more frequently invoked
but similarly futile.87 Collective bargaining agreements also restrict
attempts to reduce healthcare and pension benefits.88 Further, state
82. See THE LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 46, at 21.
83. See id. at 11.
84. See PAGANO & MCFARLAND, supra note 53, at 6.
85. See Karen Weise, Austin Is the New Brooklyn, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-10/austin-tex-dot-gains-from-urban-flight-to-
second-tier-metro-areas [http://perma.cc/J5Y9-WXVV].
86. RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 31.
87. See PAGANO & MCFARLAND, supra note 53, at 6. Through a combination of layoffs,
attribution, hiring freezes, and furloughs, municipalities are able to reduce their workforce.
But these cuts offer marginal relief, accounting for only a 3.4% reduction in workforce be-
tween September 2008 and December 2011. See THE LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 46, at 13.
88. See RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 45.
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law compels almost all municipalities to make pension contributions
to general funds regardless of constrained budgets. Modifying em-
ployment terms for new hires is politically palatable, but “such
modifications produce the smallest immediate savings.”89
Distressed municipalities that had cash reserves in 2007 invari-
ably accessed these funds as the Great Recession unfolded and now
face depleted buffers.90 For example, Sacramento tapped cash
reserves beginning in 2007.91 At that time, the reserve balance
was 31% of general revenue. By 2011, the reserve was down to just
6% of general revenue.92 Sacramento, as well as the vast majority of
other distressed municipalities, cannot rely on its cash reserve to
address future fiscal challenges.
Confronted with this brave new world, distressed municipalities
have taken desperate measures. Some municipalities have decided
to sell government assets and privatize government functions, inclu-
ding parking enforcement, park maintenance, graffiti removal,
collection of delinquent taxes, and operation of public venues, such
as zoos.93 In March 2010, New Jersey appointed a Privatization
Task Force that sought to evaluate the viability of privatization.94
Unfortunately, the vast majority of privatization transactions are
characterized by short-term cash infusions that produce either ex-
cessive future expenses or a disproportionate loss of future revenue.
For example, in late 2010, Newark opted to sell and then lease back
sixteen of the city’s buildings, including its police and fire headquar-
ters as well as symphony hall.95 The sale yielded $74 million for the
city, but leasing the buildings back will cost the city $125 million
during the lease term.96 Similarly, the City of Chicago leased its
parking meter system to a consortium led by Morgan Stanley in
order to balance its budget.97 Chicago will ultimately receive $11.6
89. Id. at 31.
90. See id. at 9.
91. See AMERICA’S BIG CITIES, supra note 42, at 16.
92. Id.
93. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Facing Budget Gaps, Cities Sell Parking, Airports, Zoo,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB2000142405274870396
0004575427150960867176 [http://perma.cc/UJ9J-CV34]. 
94. 42 N.J. Reg. 690(a) (Apr. 5, 2010).
95. Anderson, supra note 30, at 1167-68.
96. Id. 
97. See Darrell Preston, Morgan Stanley Group’s $11 Billion Makes Chicago Taxpayers
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billion from its parking meter lease, but the consortium is now
expected to make more than ten times that amount over the course
of the deal.98 Further, these one-time sales temporarily fill budget-
ary gaps but fail to produce any structural reform that improves the
municipality’s viability.99
Against this backdrop, distressed municipalities are forced to
seek some mechanism that will allow for systemic debt restructur-
ing. But current options under state and federal law are woefully
deficient.
II. MORE AGGRESSIVE FORMS OF REHABILITATION: STATE AND
FEDERAL ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS MUNICIPAL INSOLVENCY
Traditional restructuring processes tend to provide minimal relief
to municipalities with significantly compromised financial struc-
tures. As a municipality drifts from distress to crisis, local officials
must pivot to more aggressive forms of rehabilitation. Unfortunate-
ly, state and federal law offer a mix of poor options.
A. Current State Law Restructuring Approaches
Historically, state law has failed to offer municipalities meaning-
ful debt adjustment options. This phenomenon may appear to be an
intentional decision because municipal defaults are rare,100 and the
issue is difficult to address ex ante. However, defaults are rare be-
cause “state intervention ... has often prevented defaults from occur-
ring.”101 States have acted as implicit guarantors of municipal debt,




100. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
DISTRESS 13 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2013/07/23/
the-state-role-in-local-government-financial-distress [http://perma.cc/HY9Z-H8MS] [herein-
after STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT].
101. David Litvack & Frank Rizzo, Municipal Default Risk, 21 MUN. FIN. J. 25, 32 (2000);
see also Colleen Woodell et al., U.S. Municipal Rating Transitions and Defaults, 1986-2003,
24 MUN. FIN. J. 49, 55 (2004) (“Distressed municipalities will typically receive some type of
additional state aid, oversight, or other outside intervention that prevents the dramatic credit
deterioration that ... [municipalities] may suffer.”).
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artificially suppressing defaults. But the fact that states occupy this
unenviable position has not spurred a groundswell for statutory
debt resolution mechanisms. States have remained surprisingly dis-
engaged from the municipal restructuring process.
Approximately thirty-one states have no formal municipal debt
restructuring mechanism at all.102 During fiscal emergencies, ap-
pointment of a receiver is the primary option for municipalities in
these states. When a receiver is appointed, the receiver and his or
her team essentially displace key local officials and are tasked with
effecting rapid improvement. This edict forces the receiver to make
a series of reactive and aggressive changes that are “only possible
because the receiver [does] not have to run for re-election and face
the wrath of an organized, focused opposition.”103 Receivers often
employ measures that were previously rejected by local officials as
being harmful to the local community and its residents.104 Local
officials understandably seek to avoid this form of debt relief.105 And
because the vast majority of states fail to monitor local government
finances, local officials are incentivized to manage or obfuscate fiscal
red flags in order to defer such appointments.106 Receiverships are
sought infrequently and at a time when considerable harm has al-
ready been realized. By this point, the state is forced to provide a
sizeable financial bailout or loan to allow the receiver to stabilize
102. See JAMES E. SPIOTTO ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS?: HOW STATES AND
INVESTORS DEAL WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES, at B-1 to B-2 (2012); see
also STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 9-10. 
103. Ed Cyr, Thoughts on the Chelsea Receivership, 9 GOV’T FIN. REV. 23, 23 (1993). 
104. See Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership and
Local Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1135 (2012).
105. See STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 25 (describing the hostility
local officials feel towards unelected receivers usurping local democracy); see also Kossis, sup-
ra note 104, at 1134-35. Texas provides a good case study. The state offers no debt adjustment
mechanism. Instead, the state allows municipalities to either seek a receiver or file a Chapter
9 petition. Texas municipalities have consistently opted for the Chapter 9 filing. As of 2012,
Texas was the state with the third highest number of municipalities that had filed under
Chapter 9. See Steven Church, Nebraska, not California, Is King of Municipal Collapse,
BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-16/nebraska-
not-california-is-king-of-municipal-collapse [http://perma.cc/BMR2-MMUN]. 
106. See Beth Walter Honadle, The States’ Role in U.S. Local Government Fiscal Crises: A
Theoretical Model and Results of a National Survey, 26 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1431, 1434-35
(2003); Philip Kloha et al., Someone to Watch Over Me: State Monitoring of Local Fiscal Con-
ditions, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 236, 252 (2005).
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the municipality.107 Consequently, in these states, local officials
have few options and cost shifting is the unintended consequence of
the state’s disengagement. Indeed, without a meaningful restructur-
ing mechanism, local officials face a Hobson’s choice: seek a receiver
and issue themselves a pink slip, or resort to cost shifting to secure
short-term revenue.108
The remaining nineteen states offer restructuring mechanisms
that are either ad hoc or delineated.109 These mechanisms can be
further classified as being reactive or proactive. For example, Mas-
sachusetts offers an example of an ad hoc, reactive system. Under
Massachusetts state law, legislation is passed to address municipal
distress on a case-by-case basis.110 The ad hoc statute is purely re-
actionary and is effective in maintaining local autonomy. Indeed,
under this approach, state officials intervene at the request of local
officials, rather than in response to a monitoring system that tracks
107. Litvack & Rizzo, supra note 101, at 32; see also Woodell et al., supra note 101, at 55.
Chapter 9 federal bankruptcy is the other option. But only nine of the thirty-one states
referenced above unconditionally allow a municipality to file a Chapter 9 petition. See SPIOTTO
ET AL., supra note 102.
108. For example, California does not offer its municipalities a debt restructuring mech-
anism. Instead, the state has enacted a law that attempts to encourage negotiation by re-
stricting a distressed municipality’s access to Chapter 9. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (West
2014). Under California state law, a bankruptcy filing is conditioned on the municipality
satisfying one of two prerequisites: (1) participating in a non-binding negotiation for up to
ninety days with interested parties holding claims of at least $5,000,000; or (2) passing a
resolution declaring a fiscal emergency. Id. Architects of the legislation acknowledge that the
new process does not offer California municipalities any debt restructuring options or support,
nor will it reduce the number of Chapter 9 filings. See Karol K. Denniston, Neutral Evaluation
in Chapter 9 Bankruptcies: Mitigating Municipal Distress, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 261, 286-87
(2012); see also STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 4. Indeed, three
California municipalities have collapsed into Chapter 9 since the legislation took effect. In
February of 2012, the City of Stockton filed a Chapter 9 petition, followed by Mammoth
Lakes in July, and San Bernardino in August. See Jim Christie, Stockton, California Files
for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 28, 2012, 11:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
06/29/us-stockton-bankruptcy-idUSBRE85S05120120629 [http://perma.cc/X98V-9KLU];
Steven Church & James Nash, Mammoth Lakes, California, Seeks Bankruptcy Protection,
BLOOMBERG (July 4, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-03/mammoth-
lakes-california-files-for-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/C9DB-4BLE]; San Bernardino Files for
Bankruptcy, CNN (Aug. 2, 2012, 3:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/02/us/california-city-
bankruptcy/ [http://perma.cc/637D-L7EH].
109. See David R. Berman, Takeovers of Local Governments: An Overview and Evaluation
of State Policies, 25 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM 55, 57-58 (1995). 
110. See SPIOTTO ET AL., supra note 102, at 41-43.
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financial triggers.111 This dynamic avoids divisive arguments re-
garding the fidelity of the local democracy.112
But this approach is plagued by a number of faults. Primarily, as
with all ad hoc systems, intervention is at the whim of the state
legislature. Procedures are not codified, which leads to crippling
uncertainty and disparate treatment among municipalities.113 This
approach also undermines bargaining. Counter-parties, including
bondholders and unions, believe that the state will come to the
rescue, which emboldens holdouts. Local officials believe that the
state will come to the rescue, which creates moral hazard.114 Access
to credit and borrowing costs are also distorted. Reactive approaches
are similarly deficient because they greatly increase the odds that
the municipality will have experienced irreparable deterioration by
the time the state intervenes. As discussed above, local officials are
loath to relinquish control. By the time state officials assume the
reins, drastic measures tend to be the only ones available. Even if
the state is able to balance the municipality’s budget, it often fails
to address the systemic deficiencies that led to the municipality’s
financial distress. The approach invariably addresses the symptoms,
not the disease.115
Unfortunately, states with delineated debt restructuring mech-
anisms have also failed to enact comprehensive approaches that
offer municipalities the means to efficiently and affordably address
111. See Berman, supra note 109, at 62 (discussing Bridgeport, Connecticut’s request for
state intervention regarding its financial crisis in the early 1990s).
112. See id.
113. For example, the New York state legislature was generally more permissive when
Yonkers and Newburgh experienced financial distress, allowing the cities greater autonomy
and freedom to access the debt markets. But the state was less pliant when Buffalo, Troy,
Erie County, and Nassau County experienced distress. For those municipalities, the state
displaced local officials and appointed an oversight board. The boards for each municipality
had differing powers and responsibilities. See STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note
100, at 22.
114. For example, in 2004, Massachusetts was forced to extend the City of Springfield a
$52 million state loan in order to allow the city to maintain essential services and avoid pay-
ment defaults. The State was then forced to extend the repayment deadline in 2009. See Dan
Ring, Massachusetts Senate Passes Relief Bill for Springfield, REPUBLICAN NEWSROOM (Jan.
6, 2009, 9:34 PM) http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/01/springfield_bailout. html
[http://perma.cc/6B68-FJCC]. 
115. Connecticut and New York are states that also employ an ad hoc, reactive approach
to municipalities in distress and have experienced varying degrees of success. See STATE ROLE
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 22.
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structural deficiencies. Almost all of these mechanisms are reactive.
For example, Oregon attempted to fill the legislative void on this
issue in 2012. A new law authorizes counties to declare a public
safety services emergency.116 If the governor agrees with the coun-
ty’s assessment, a fiscal assistance board is established to devise a
recovery plan.117 This is a reactive mechanism that is plagued by the
same limitations noted above. Further, Oregon has failed to create
a structure where a distressed county’s creditors are properly
motivated to make concessions. Indeed, the fiscal assistance board
has absolutely no leverage. The board is not afforded the ability to
modify contracts, and Oregon state law does not allow counties or
cities to file a Chapter 9 petition.118 The law attempts to bring
parties to the table and negotiate a settlement, but fails to give the
fiscal assistance board or the county any leverage to secure
consensual agreements. Because Chapter 9 is unavailable, creditors
will typically hold out on the premise that the state will intervene
if the situation deteriorates. Without any meaningful threat or
incentive, the county can only expect meager concessions. Oregon’s
approach exemplifies the problems that plague the vast majority of
delineated state restructuring mechanisms.119
Ultimately, distressed municipalities have a dearth of options at
the state level. This problem is amplified by the deficiencies at the
federal level.
116. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 203.095 (West 2012).
117. See id.; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 203.100 (West 2013).
118. Oregon state law allows only irrigation and drainage districts to file for Chapter 9. See
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 548.705 (West 2015).
119. A few states have adopted proactive, delineated debt restructuring mechanisms, but
these mechanisms have their own idiosyncratic deficiencies. For example, Florida has a pro-
active monitoring system for its municipalities. Municipalities are required to submit to the
state a detailed financial report each year. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 218.30-218.391 (West 2014).
The audited report must include the municipality’s revenue, expenses, and long-term debt.
Reports that indicate significant unresolved financial issues are submitted to a state oversight
committee. Id. § 218.39. State law also makes municipalities subject to review and oversight
by the governor if certain financial-distress indicators are present. Id. § 218.503. These
procedures theoretically allow state officials to identify distressed municipalities prior to
crisis. However, as discussed further below, the restructuring mechanism is limited because
it does not contemplate intervention by state officials. Instead, local officials are allowed to
attempt to resolve financial crises but are not allowed to file a Chapter 9 petition without
obtaining approval from the governor. This system does not create a structure that facilitates
negotiation or enhances the prospect of meaningful settlement.
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B. The Misplaced Fulcrum: Why Chapter 9 Is Not the Answer
In the last forty years, the perception of corporate restructuring
under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code has evolved dramatically.
In the 1960s, distressed companies and the law firms that repre-
sented them did not view financial restructuring through federal
bankruptcy law as an option.120 Bankruptcy’s stigma was to be
avoided at all costs.121 But over time, the stigma eroded, and bank-
ruptcy reorganization became a viable option to struggling corpora-
tions.122 This metamorphosis came about in part due to the unique
powers that Chapter 11 bestows on corporate debtors. Indeed,
Chapter 11 is a debt restructuring process that offers myriad forms
of relief that are completely unavailable outside of federal bank-
ruptcy court. A powerfully engaged bankruptcy judge guides the
Chapter 11 process and can compel negotiations and extract con-
cessions from recalcitrant constituencies. The process moves swiftly
due to the limited period during which the debtor has the exclusive
right to propose a plan of reorganization. Chapter 11’s benefits are
unquestioned in the business community, and a bankruptcy filing
is no longer viewed as some repugnant last resort.123 However,
Chapter 9 bears little resemblance to Chapter 11.
A Chapter 9 bankruptcy judge plays an extremely different case
role than a Chapter 11 bankruptcy judge. Bankruptcy judges are
federal actors precluded from directly interfering with a governmen-
tal arm of a sovereign state. A federal court’s interference with local
democracy could undermine structural principles of federalism and
separation of powers.124 This noninterference principle demotes the
120. See Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition—From Boom to Bust and Into the Fu-
ture, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 376 (2007).
121. See id. 
122. See, e.g., Maria Chutchian, 5 Years Later: What We've Learned Since GM's Bank-
ruptcy, LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2014, 8:38 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/532302/5-years-
later-what-we-ve-learned-since-gm-s-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/XGV4-HYQF] (“Consumer
interest in GM and Chrysler has not wavered in the years following their bankruptcies, and
that can probably be credited to the decline of the stigma that once accompanied a bankruptcy
filing, Chuck Tatelbaum of Tripp Scott said. ‘It used to be ... almost like a scarlet letter on you
if you were a debtor. Now it’s just considered a business matter,’ he said.”).
123. See id.
124. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 435 (1993).
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bankruptcy judge overseeing a Chapter 9 municipal debtor to the
role of a detached case manager.125 The judge lacks the power to
guide the case or compel officials to take actions that will address
the debtor’s systemic deficiencies.126 Unlike corporate restructur-
ings, Chapter 9 filings are “intensely a negotiation model because
the judge’s powers are greatly limited.”127 Chapter 9 is a poor tool for
resolving a municipality’s financial problems because judges lack
proper governance controls over municipal debtors and local of-
ficials.128
The Code does not contemplate a Chapter 9 judge facilitating
resource adjustment, and other parties appear unable or unwilling
to fill this void. Indeed, a passive jurist creates a problem that goes
beyond mere unrealized utility. A passive jurist is attractive to local
officials due to political expediency. As noted above, key local offi-
cials are invariably displaced in state law reorganizations by a re-
ceiver, a state agency, or some sort of control board. Displacement
is one of the worst outcomes an elected official can face.129 “Just as
125. See Gillette, supra note 33, at 291-92.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (“Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor
consents or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case
or otherwise, interfere with—(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2)
any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any
income-producing property.”). 
127. STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 12 (quoting Chief Judge
Christopher M. Klein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California).
128. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 403, 417 (2014); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 124, at 435-36.
129. The bankruptcy case of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania offers insight into this phenomenon.
In 1972, the City of Harrisburg opened a for-profit incinerator “to burn trash, produce steam
and eventually generate electricity.” Stephen C. Fehr, Pittsburgh and Harrisburg: A Tale of
Two Deep-in-Debt Cities, STATELINE (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/10/20/pittsburgh-and-harrisburg-a-tale-of-two-deepindebt-
cities [http://perma.cc/US87-CGMV]. The city issued bonds to finance the project, but the
incinerator’s costs exceeded revenues. Id. In 2003, the federal government shut down the
incinerator, demanding that it be retrofitted to comply with the Federal Clean Air Act. See
id. By that time, the project was $100 million in debt. Id. Undeterred, city officials decided to
borrow $125 million to bring the incinerator into compliance. Id. The work was to be per-
formed by Barlow Projects, but the company was unable to finish the project and the City was
forced to borrow additional funds to complete the project. See Moringiello, supra note 33, at
239. By 2011, the city was unable to make payments on its bond debt, which was four times
the city’s annual budget. Id. at 240. Facing the prospect of a state takeover and appointment
of a receiver, city officials authorized and initiated a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing with the
hope of maintaining decision-making authority and exploring other means of obtaining short-
term revenue, including a tax increase and asset sale. See id. at 240-43. City officials pursued
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the management of Chapter 11 debtors are often accused of ma-
nipulating the process to save their own jobs, so it is for the ‘manage-
ment’ of a municipality.”130 Chapter 9 can become a safe haven for
local officials who wish to stay in power and need more time to
devise cost-shifting measures.131 Indeed, officials have generally
enjoyed autonomy in Chapter 9 and many have sought measures
that provide short-term revenue with oversized long-term costs.132
This phenomenon explains why so many municipalities encounter
significant financial distress shortly after exiting expensive Chap-
ter 9 processes.133 Ultimately, the risk of additional cost shifting
plagues Chapter 9, and the process can be used to merely perpetu-
ate an existing power structure as opposed to supporting structural
improvements.
bankruptcy even though the state had explicitly banned the city from filing a petition. See id.
at 243.
130. Judith Elkin, A “Time Out” for Municipalities: The Recent Workings of Chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVI-
GATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES AND ANALYZING RECENT
TRENDS AND CASES, ASPATORE, 2011 WL 5053638, at *6 (2011).
131. For example, Pat Morris was the mayor of San Bernardino, California when the city
filed its bankruptcy petition in August 2012. See Editorial, San Bernardino Mayor Pat Morris
Never Stopped Looking Forward, SAN BERNARDINO CTY. SUN (Feb. 28, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://
www.sbsun.com/opinion/20140228/san-bernardino-mayor-pat-morris-never-stopped-looking-
forward-editorial [http://perma.cc/E8PA-H3TR]. Morris remained mayor until February 2014.
Id. Similarly, Matthew Lehman was mayor of Mammoth Lakes, California when the city filed
its bankruptcy petition in July 2012. Lehman Passes Gavel to Wood, MAMMOTH TIMES (June
20, 2013), http://www.mammothtimes.com/content/lehman-passes-gavel-wood [http://perma.
cc/A6KW-ZSP6]. Lehman remained in power until June 2013. Id. Ron Davis was mayor of
Pritchard, Alabama when the city filed its bankruptcy petition in October 2009. See Brendan
Kirby, Troy Ephriam Defeats Incumbent in Prichard Mayoral Race, 2 Councilmen Lose,
AL.COM (Oct. 23, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://blog.al.com/live/2012/10/troy_ephriam_defeats_
incumbent.html [http://perma.cc/DR5H-XYBA]. Davis remained in power until January 2013.
Id.
132. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
133. See Denniston, supra note 108, at 273 (discussing the bankruptcy case of the city of
Vallejo, California and questioning a “process that takes three years to complete and results
in confirmation of a plan of adjustment that leaves the city with a $3.4 million dollar shortfall
in its first post-bankruptcy budget”); see also Barnett Wright, One Year Ago Jefferson County
Emerged from Bankruptcy. Did Wall Street Fleece the County Commission?, AL.COM (Dec. 3,
2014), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2014/12/one_year_later_jefferson_count.
html [http://perma.cc/5WJF-YUPU] (describing the difficulties that Jefferson County is experi-
encing even after undertaking an expensive Chapter 9 bankruptcy process).
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The poorly formed results produced by the municipal bankruptcy
process come at a staggering financial cost.134 We can use large-scale
corporate bankruptcy cases as a point of reference. There exists
extensive literature discussing professionals’ fees in Chapter 11
cases.135 Chapter 11 corporate debtors retain a wide array of profes-
sionals to navigate turbulent waters efficiently and successfully. Not
surprisingly, the fees generated in these cases can be astronomi-
cal.136 In the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case, professional fees
exceeded $1 billion.137 Municipal bankruptcy cases have similar dy-
namics. “Preparing and litigating a bankruptcy filing for a munic-
ipality is no less costly than a major Chapter 11 filing because of the
complexity of the issues, and the amount of time and the number of
legal, financial and accounting experts needed to reach conclu-
sion.”138 These unavoidable expenses deplete municipal debtors’
already diminished financial coffers.139
134. See ROBERT DOTY, BLOOMBERG VISUAL GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL BONDS 23 (2012) (explain-
ing that state officials are “well-aware that [Chapter 9] proceedings are extremely expensive,
cumbersome, and time-consuming, with uncertain outcomes”); see also Spiotto, supra note 25
(“The Detroit bankruptcy was long and expensive. It is safe to say that the availability of a
bankruptcy option has not proven to be a ‘quick or easy fix’ to municipalities.”). 
135. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An
Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 141 (2008); Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 82 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008); Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Attorneys, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447
(2012); Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical
Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509 (2000).
136. See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in Chapter 11, 7 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 117, 119 (2012).
137. See generally Liz Moyer, Lehman Fees Hit $1 Billion and Counting, WALL ST. J., Nov.
23, 2010, at C1 (observing that “[l]ead bankruptcy counsel Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP
got paid $8.8 million in fees and expenses in October, increasing the firm's total to $245.8
million”); see also Brian Baxter, Bankruptcy Bonanza: Records Show $80 Million in Legal Fees
for GM, AM. L. DAILY (June 15, 2009, 11:03 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/
2009/06/80-million-in-legal-fees-for-bankrupt-gm.html [http://perma.cc/GG6F-EKFL] (explain-
ing that “GM has paid more than $80 million in fees to [Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Jenner &
Block, and Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn] over the past six months,” with Weil
Gotshal billing around $54 million, Jenner & Block billing $11.3 million, and Honigman
billing $15.1 million); Brian Baxter, Bankruptcy Court Approves $31 Million More in Chrysler
Legal Fees, AM. L. DAILY (Oct. 27, 2009, 6:40 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/
2009/10/chrysler-fees.html [http://perma.cc/YWU5-MD9T].
138. See Elkin, supra note 130, at *6.
139. Id.; see also Barnett Wright, Why Jefferson County Still Pays Millions to Lawyers
for a Bankruptcy that Ended in 2013, AL.COM (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/
birmingham/index.ssf/2015/03/why_jefferson_county_continues.html [http://perma.cc/GLV9-
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Uncertainty amplifies Chapter 9’s cost to debtors. The law of mu-
nicipal restructuring in Chapter 9 is undeveloped because of the
relative dearth of filings.140
Since 1980, of the 55,000 municipal governments in the United
States that sell bonds, only 276 have filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion—averaging out to less than ten per year.141 By comparison, in
2013 alone, 33,212 businesses sought bankruptcy court protec-
tion.142 The relatively meager volume of municipal cases leads to a
crippling lack of instructive case law on key issues, most notably the
ability of a municipality to reject collective bargaining agreements
with employee unions and reduce principal debt obligations owed to
bondholders. Succinctly, “[municipal bankruptcy] law is very un-
clear and uncertain.”143 Municipalities and the parties affected by
their financial distress have little guidance on how courts will rule
on key issues.
This lack of precedent undermines settlement. Parties disad-
vantaged by the bankruptcy process are inclined to litigate even
relatively minor disputes.144 Further, adverse rulings merely set
the stage for appeals because the paucity of municipal opinions
at the bankruptcy court level is dwarfed by the lack of guidance at
the appellate level. This litigation tornado decimates municipal
resources.145
TSZB].
140. See RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 55 (explaining how a Chapter 9 filing can
be an expensive venture into the unknown).
141. See AMERICA’S BIG CITIES, supra note 42, at 7.
142. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES FILED, BY CHAPTER
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2013,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics/bankruptcystatistics/bankruptcyfilings/2013/12
13_f2.pdf [http://perma.cc/DHE4-BSMX].
143. RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 56.
144. See David L. Tillem, An Overview of Bankruptcy Litigation, in BANKRUPTCY
LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LEADING LAWYERS ON KEY CASE STRATEGIES, RISK
ASSESSMENT, AND SETTLEMENT CONSIDERATIONS, ASPATORE, 2008 WL 5939819, at *6 (2008)
(“Bankruptcy litigations, however, can be somewhat more intense if a debtor ... has already
abandoned any notion of saving its reputation and is more inclined to try to save its life or its
existence. The creditor, on the other hand, may see little advantage in negotiating with the
debtor, given that many bankruptcy issues are win or lose.”).
145. For example, disputes over whether the debtor is eligible to file a bankruptcy petition
under Section 109 are exhausting. See Michael Newman, Comment, BAPCPA’s New Section
109(H) Credit Counseling Requirement: Is it Having the Effect Congress Intended?, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 489, 491 (2007) (“Generally speaking, the consequences of a debtor’s failure to comply
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Chapter 9’s harmful effects extend even further. Federal bank-
ruptcy court is an extremely public forum. All filings are public,
including sensitive disclosures about a debtor’s systemic financial
and structural problems.146 The public nature of these proceedings
will invariably lead to a suspension or, at the very least, a reduction
in a municipality’s credit rating.147 The municipality will experience
higher borrowing costs even after it exits bankruptcy.148 And, de-
pending on its treatment of bondholders, the additional costs could
be significant, undermining the municipality’s post-bankruptcy re-
covery. Adjacent municipalities, and the home state may also face
higher borrowing costs if the market fears that the problems affect-
ing the debtor could spread.149
Bankruptcy professionals and scholars may dispute the extent of
Chapter 9’s deficiencies, but in many ways, the effect of these
deficiencies has already been corroborated by the municipal debtor
market. As noted above, less than 0.1% of all municipal govern-
ments issuing debt “have filed for bankruptcy protection since
1980.”150 And only eleven states give their municipalities the dis-
cretion to file a Chapter 9 petition.151 Naturally, the lack of munici-
pal bankruptcy cases since 1980 could be attributed to either a lack
with the eligibility provisions of section 109 ... are far more severe than the consequences of
failure to comply with the ‘routine’ filing requirements of section 521.”). There is no eligibility-
inquiry equivalent for corporate debtors. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). But municipal debtors
are faced with a gatekeeper issue that is not guided by case law and is characterized by
extremely subjective determinations. Eligibility disputes are costly and creditors who have
been unwillingly dragged into bankruptcy invariably appeal adverse rulings with the knowl-
edge that a victory ends the entire proceeding. The drain on municipal coffers from this one
issue is disproportionately crippling.
146. See Elkin, supra note 130, at *7.
147. See id. at *6.
148. See id.
149. LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 1, at 167. Although New York City did not file for
bankruptcy, its ordeal was extremely public, and it affected the borrowing costs for the state
and other cities within New York.
150. See AMERICA’S BIG CITIES, supra note 42, at 7, 13. The vast majority of Chapter 9
filings are made by utility, water, and other special districts that generally manage one
discrete social service and have no taxing authority. See generally Spiotto, supra note 37.
151. See AMERICA’S BIG CITIES, supra note 42, at 9-10; GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR
STATE & LOCAL GOV’T LEADERSHIP, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL CRISES: THE CRISIS FACING
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND WHY IT MATTERS 11 (2013), http://www.s3.amazonaws.com/chssweb/
documents/12810/original/GMU_Fiscal_Lit_Review.pdf?1379616883 [http://perma.cc/M56U-
BTCS].
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of free access or a high level of financial stability across the sub-
national landscape. But this is not the entire story. The scarcity of
cases is the result, at least in part, of the belief key state decision-
makers hold that Chapter 9 is a flawed process to be avoided.152 In
some respects, the municipal debtor market has already rejected
Chapter 9.
Nevertheless, a wave of insolvency is approaching this market.153
Chapter 9 is not the fulcrum point for municipal recovery. The solu-
tion lies within a state law debt adjustment mechanism.
III. A NEW FULCRUM POINT154
Due to Chapter 9’s financial and non-financial costs, inherent
inefficiencies, poorly formed results, and potential impotency, mu-
nicipalities need a meaningful restructuring option at the state
level. States should establish a comprehensive restructuring mech-
anism under state law, and Chapter 9 should be an absolute last
resort—a venue to resolve the most vexing municipal problems.
Basic notions of federalism buttress this construct. Although the
harm from municipal distress radiates, directly harmed parties are
invariably local. In that respect, municipal distress represents a
truly regional problem. Aside from a few institutional bondholders,
almost all primary stakeholders, including elected officials, over-
seers, current and former employees, and creditors, are located
within the home state.155 Resolution networks are intrastate, not
interstate. Consequently, the role that federal bankruptcy law can
play must be minimized. Elected state officials—not an appointed
federal jurist—should be tasked with resolving the municipality’s
financial difficulties.
152. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
153. See Chutchian, supra note 31.
154. My proposal does not attempt to create a parallel bankruptcy system under state law.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (providing that any “State law prescribing a method of
composition of indebtedness [for a municipality] may not bind any creditor that does not con-
sent to such a composition”). My proposal does not attempt to provide any method to specif-
ically adjust a municipality’s indebtedness and is unaffected by § 903. 
155. See generally Hannah Heck, Comment, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The
Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 92-97 (2011).
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Nevertheless, Chapter 9’s minimized role should not be construed
as superfluous. Chapter 9 is not an ideal forum for municipal debt
restructuring, but the provision serves an important purpose. In
addition to providing a venue for nearly terminal municipalities,
Chapter 9 incentivizes parties to negotiate when a proper out-of-
court negotiation structure is available.156 Key constituencies fear
Chapter 9. Employee unions fear Chapter 9 primarily because ju-
dicial trends indicate a growing acceptance of collective bargaining
agreement modification.157 Bondholders fear Chapter 9 because of
an evolving view that bondholder obligations are not sacrosanct and
principal payment obligations can be slashed.158 At the same time,
state officials also fear Chapter 9 because the costs of the process—
including increased borrowing costs for the state as well as munici-
palities adjacent to the debtor—and the likelihood of compromised
results mean that a true recovery may be elusive.159 Hence, by
negotiating in Chapter 9’s long shadow, key parties’ incentives to
compromise are heightened. This shared-preference dynamic
enhances the prospects that a properly designed out-of-court
negotiation structure will prove successful.
A. Overarching Goals
This Article proposes a clear negotiation structure for municipal
debt adjustment—a concept that is entirely lacking at the state level
156. See Moringiello, supra note 128, at 439 (“If the state wants to participate in the
Chapter 9 case, it can do so by conditioning its Chapter 9 authorization on the debtor's
participation in a state oversight program. If the state does not want to do so, the court can
ensure that only worthy municipalities—those that are insolvent and that have negotiated
in good faith with their creditors—can file.”).
157. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 362 (2006); In re City of Stockton, 478
B.R. 8, 15-16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012); In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. 262, 270-71 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2010); see also Matt Chiappardi, Detroit’s Ch. 9 Plan Draws Fierce, Immediate Criticism,
LAW360 (Feb. 21, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/512047/detroit-s-ch-9-plan-
draws-fierce-immediate-criticism [http://perma.cc/9P7J-NWYD]; Maria Chutchian, Proposed
Cuts Will Heat up Detroit’s Battle with Retirees, LAW360 (Apr. 2, 2014, 9:23 PM), http://www.
law360.com/articles/524194/proposed-cuts-will-heat-up-detroit-s-battle-with-retirees [http://
perma.cc/6NYD-XPEV].
158. See Chiappardi, supra note 157; Maria Chutchian, Detroit Plan Threatens Muni Bond
Market, SIFMA Says, LAW360 (May 12, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/536
928/detroit-plan-threatens-muni-bond-market-sifma-says [http://perma.cc/RE7Z-PN4E].
159. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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and one that municipal insolvency literature has failed to explore.
In many respects, this Article is working on a clean slate.160 As a
result, the first directive is to delineate clearly my proposal’s goals
and benefits. After presenting my debt adjustment mechanism’s
overarching objectives, Part IV will explore system details.
1. Sustainable Viability
Throughout this Article, I have tried to highlight key differences
between municipal and corporate debtors. These differences inform
the most significant goal of any comprehensive state debt adjust-
ment mechanism. Corporate debtors generally enter restructuring
with a host of positive alternative endings. A corporate debtor may
wish to travel through the Chapter 11 process and emerge as a
reorganized company, as American Airlines recently did.161 Another
option is to sell a few key assets in order to improve cash flow or
even sell essentially all assets, as Chrysler did in 2009.162 A corpor-
ate debtor can also file for bankruptcy and pursue litigation claims
based exclusively on federal bankruptcy law.163 Finally, a corporate
debtor can liquidate, allowing creditors to stake a claim to whatever
funds are realized after an orderly sale, as Circuit City did in
2009.164 These options afford management leverage in negotiating
with creditors.
Further, creditors and employees are not captives of this process.
Creditors can choose to exit the process. In large cases, creditor
160. Scholars have indicated that some form of state debt adjustment mechanism may
be worthwhile, but they fail to explore the issue in a substantive manner or explain how
municipalities can prevail against a Contracts Clause challenge to any unilateral contract
modification proposed by the state. See, e.g., Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code:
A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 354 (2010). 
161. Paul Stinson, American Airlines Reorganization Plan Takes Flight; Vows ‘Full
Recovery by Creditors,’ BLOOMBERG BNA (May 8, 2013), http://www.bna.com/american-
airlines-reorganization-plan-takes-flight-vows-full-recovery-by-creditors/ [http://perma.cc/
UCW7-2CXV].
162. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Chrysler Gets Judge’s Approval for Asset Sale, WASH. POST
(June 1, 2009, 10:44 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/01/
AR2009060100804.html [http://perma.cc/2W3T-8PPY].
163. See supra Part II.B (discussing the frequency and advantages of corporations pursuing
solutions under federal bankruptcy law).
164. Parija B. Kavilanz, Circuit City to Shut Down, CNN MONEY (Jan. 16, 2009, 5:50 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/16/news/companies/circuit_city/ [http://perma.cc/9KGE-VGJZ].
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claims and corporate debt can be sold easily. Employees can quit,
taking their portable 401k plans with them. In many respects,
creditor recovery is not necessarily contingent on the debtor’s sur-
vival. Creditors may recover more if the debtor is liquidated, sold to
another party, or if key assets are sold.165 Relationships between the
corporate debtor and its creditors are temporal.
Municipal debtors do not have these diverse restructuring op-
tions. Large municipalities cannot liquidate,166 effectively sell off
significant assets,167 or be acquired by another subnational gov-
ernment. This fact narrows a distressed municipality’s options
considerably. Municipalities enter restructuring with the sole objec-
tive of emerging after achieving some form of debt relief. Creditors
are usually bound to municipalities through this process. Current
employees have the option of simply quitting their jobs, but, as a
whole, municipal employees have developed a skill set not easily
transferrable to the private sector. More importantly, the municipal-
ity owes employees pension and healthcare benefits. An employee
cannot sell this obligation.
Bondholders are in a slightly better position because there is a
market for municipal debt. By the time a municipality is seriously
exploring restructuring options, however, the debt may be selling at
a discount that would make a sale foolish.168 Bondholders frequently
hold an illiquid instrument that will not mature for many years.169
The conclusion is that key municipal creditors and the municipality
experience a level of interdependence that is entirely unique com-
pared to the private sector. These creditors need the municipality to
become healthy and viable. A full recovery on creditor claims is pos-
sible only by rejuvenating the municipality. Many creditors fail to
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. This option does, however, theoretically exist for small municipalities. See Michelle
Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers of Local
Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 600-01 (2012). 
167. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
168. This discount is largely due to severity of the financial crisis municipalities find them-
selves in before they file for bankruptcy. The worse the financial situation, the less the debt
is valued on the market. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
169. See Allan Roth, Muni Bonds Costs—The Whole Truth, CBS MONEYWATCH (Aug.
30, 2010, 11:19 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/muni-bonds-costs-the-whole-truth/ [http://
perma.cc/6DP4-SBLU] (warning investors that municipal bonds are among the most illiquid
assets available to investors).
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appreciate this fact. Consequently, my proposal’s primary objective
is to afford a municipality the means to make necessary structural
changes that will ensure sustainable viability. Indeed, sustainable
viability represents the only means by which key stakeholders can
be made whole and residents can continue to receive essential
services in an optimal manner.
2. Proactive, Delineated Debt Adjustment Mechanism
Effective debt restructuring mechanisms are proactive. As noted
above, reactive systems have excessive deficiencies, not least of
which is that the municipality is nearly terminal by the time re-
structuring officials intervene.170 Changes made in 1978 to Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code best exemplify the true value of a proac-
tive approach. 
The Bankruptcy Act was the precursor to the current Bankruptcy
Code.171 Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act applied to corporate re-
organizations and required, in almost all corporate bankruptcies,
the appointment of a trustee upon approval of the bankruptcy peti-
tion.172 The filing of a bankruptcy petition was, therefore, a precur-
sor to key executives being removed from their positions with the
company.173 The rationale for this approach was the mistaken belief
that new management would increase the odds of a successful reor-
ganization.174 In 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States (Commission)175 discovered that this provision
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. Samir D. Parikh, The Improper Application of the Clear and Convincing Standard of
Proof: Are Bankruptcy Courts Distorting Accepted Risk Allocation Schemes?, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
271, 300 (2009).
172. Id. 
173. See id. (indicating bankruptcy court appointed a disinterested trustee after the
bankruptcy petition had been approved).
174. This understanding of a trustee’s effect on bankruptcy proceedings has changed over
time. A presumption against appointing a trustee exists today because it is understood that
current management’s familiarity with a business allows them to most efficiently orchestrate
the corporation’s rehabilitation. Id. at 302.
175. In 1968, a sub-committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee decided that a special
commission was necessary in order to recommend changes to the Bankruptcy Act. See Harvey
R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for
Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 173 (2004). In
1970, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission was formed. Id. In 1973, the Commission
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had an unintended consequence: managers delayed filings while
exploring aggressive rehabilitation techniques.176 These tactics were
rarely fruitful. Distressed companies frequently found their way
into bankruptcy in a condition where resources had been depleted
and liquidation was the only option.177 The Commission found that
Chapter X’s approach actually decreased the likelihood of a success-
ful reorganization.178 In 1978, Congress amended the Bankruptcy
Code to allow a corporate debtor’s management to continue manag-
ing the debtor post-petition, except in cases of pre-petition fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, gross mismanagement, or similar crimi-
nal conduct.179 This change was an attempt to make the bankruptcy
process a proactive rehabilitation measure as opposed to the exclu-
sive forum for the postmortem.180
The same perverse incentives that the Commission addressed
in the 1970s plague municipal insolvency today.181 To address this
dynamic, a successful debt restructuring mechanism must con-
template aggressive, proactive involvement by individuals able to
identify and address systemic problems, as well as make necessary
structural changes at a time when these changes are meaningful.
Multi-faceted monitoring is necessary to empower a proactive ap-
proach. Further, the restructuring process must have a sense of
urgency. Parties should negotiate exhaustively, but within specific
periods of time. Excessive rounds of negotiation increase costs and
suppress meaningful agreement. By limiting the period for negotia-
tion, restructuring officials must be empowered to take aggressive
action upon expiration of the negotiation period. This dynamism will
hopefully minimize process costs while encouraging bargaining.
issued a report that proposed various changes and explained the policy arguments behind
many of these changes. Id. at 174-75. This report served as the basis for many of the changes
embodied in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 173-75.
176. Id.
177. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART
I, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 14 (1973).
178. Id. at 36-37.
179. See Parikh, supra note 171, at 299-300; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2010). Trustees
may also be appointed if the appointment is in the best interests of creditors, equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate. § 1104(a)(2).
180. See Parikh, supra note 171, at 302.
181. See supra Part I.B.
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Relatedly, an effective debt adjustment mechanism must be de-
lineated to provide certainty. A process where parameters and
procedures are defined ex ante incentivizes municipality and credi-
tor constituencies to engage fully. Clarity engenders certainty.
Under this premise, all key constituencies have a meaningful under-
standing of available options. This dynamic minimizes posturing
and irrational threats. Without this certainty, the prospect of a state
or federal bailout emboldens holdouts. This destructive behavior is
typically associated with creditors, but it also affects municipal
officials. A debt adjustment mechanism that precludes bailouts
addresses the holdout phenomenon. Taking bailouts off the table
also minimizes the risk of reckless pre-crisis behavior by local
officials that often precipitates financial distress.
Most importantly, I propose eliminating the prospect of bailouts
in order to right-size borrowing costs for municipalities. Fiscal
federalism theorists have persuasively argued that local officials are
incentivized to overgraze at the debt market commons on the pre-
mise that their obligations are backstopped by their home state.182
This implicit guarantee artificially suppresses borrowing costs.183
General state limits on borrowing and balanced budget require-
ments are easily circumvented.184 Consequently, these provisions
often fail to address perverse incentives and harm externalization.185
Less obvious is the premise that an unfounded expectation of a state
bailout creates moral hazard risk on the part of lenders.186 Clandes-
tine guarantors distort the lending market. Instead of lending
prudently, lenders are incentivized to overlend, with the knowledge
that any default will be covered by the state.187 If lenders believe
that the true risk of default approaches zero, the only material issue
182. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 33, at 287; see also Woodell et al., supra note 101, at 55
(“Distressed municipalities in most states do not have a bankruptcy option; it is frequently
restricted by law .... Distressed municipalities will typically receive some additional state aid,
oversight, or other outside intervention that prevents the dramatic credit deterioration that
[municipalities] may suffer.”).
183. Gillette, supra note 33, at 286 (stating that implicit state guarantee reduces the mu-
nicipalities’ borrowing interest rates).
184. See Spiotto, supra note 37, at 8.
185. See id. at 8-9.
186. See Richard C. Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787,
800-01 (2012). I use the term “lenders” here to include bondholders. 
187. Id. at 801.
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that must be priced is interest rate fluctuations.188 A delineated
reorganization process that eschews bailouts will encourage lenders
to adjust the cost of borrowing for municipalities. Ultimately, this
change will deter local officials from overgrazing at the debt com-
mons and force lenders to assess municipal borrower default risk
accurately, which will ideally minimize lender moral hazard.189
3. Meaningful Unilateral Contract Modification Options
An effective restructuring mechanism does not need to create uni-
lateral contract modification options for municipal or state officials.
The system does, however, need to acknowledge that such options
may exist under applicable state and federal law, and should
empower restructuring officials to use these options if necessary.190
Municipal debt restructuring is a process plagued by an extraordi-
nary level of inertia. An array of carrots and sticks are necessary to
motivate creditors to come to the bargaining table and consider
meaningful concessions. The threat of unilateral contract modifica-
tion is a necessary—though not sufficient—criterion for successful
negotiation. Without this threat, contract counter-parties are con-
tent to hold out for a state bailout.191 Many scholars, academics, and
policymakers have taken the position that the Constitution’s
Contracts Clause and sister provisions found in state constitutions
represent an absolute bar on contract modification.192 This belief
188. See id. at 799-801 (arguing that municipalities holding bonds are not punished for
default because states act as guarantors on their municipalities’ bonds, which leads to
overlending).
189. See Gillette, supra note 33, at 311-12 (noting that the prospect of a bailout exacerbates
the overgrazing problem because the default risk is subsidized by the state).
190. For a full discussion, see infra Part III.C. 
191. Debtors hold out for the same reason lenders overlend and municipalities overgraze:
the belief that the state will not allow a municipality to fail. See supra notes 182-89 and ac-
companying text.
192. See, e.g., David Crump, The Economic Purpose of the Contract Clause, 66 SMU L. REV.
687, 689-92 (2013) (arguing that the Clause was adopted for economic reasons, namely to
decrease the risk associated with investment); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization
of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705 (1984) (arguing that the Clause acts as
a substantial protection to economic liberties against state interference); Douglas W. Kmiec
& John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (1987) (arguing that, properly understood, the Clause prohi-
bits all state retrospective interference with contracts); Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts,
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affects collective bargaining agreements and municipal bonds. As
explored below, however, this prohibition is wildly overstated and,
quite frankly, misunderstood.193 My restructuring mechanism ac-
knowledges that unilateral contract modification may be permissi-
ble for a municipality in financial crisis. Restructuring officials are
empowered to use all available powers to gain concessions and
attempt to achieve sustainable viability for the municipality. The
battle defining the lawful scope of these powers may be waged in
state or federal court, but my system does not preclude nor attempt
to discourage this fight.
Ideally, as discussed below, a truly distressed municipality would
be able to plausibly threaten unilateral modification of its contracts
in order to spur necessary concessions from key constituencies.194
Consensual—not unilateral—modifications are my restructuring
mechanism’s overriding objective.195 But consensual modifications
cannot be realized without proper incentives.
4. Maintain Access to Credit Markets
My restructuring mechanism removes the state as an implicit
guarantor of a municipality’s debt. This alteration could theoreti-
cally raise borrowing costs. In some cases, this change, coupled with
a financial crisis, could prevent a municipality from accessing credit
markets. Consequently, keeping financing avenues open is one of
the primary tasks for restructuring officials under my system. My
Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 597, 598-99 (1987) (noting that state impairment of public contracts is subject to a more
rigorous review than state impairments to private contracts); Robert C. Palmer, Obligations
of Contracts: Intent and Distortion, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 635-46 (1987) (analyzing the
legislative history and text of the Clause and concluding it was meant to impose an absolute
prohibition on state interference with contracts); see also Michael Cataldo, Note, Revival or
Revolution: U.S. Trust’s Role in the Contracts Clause Circuit Split, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1145,
1147-48 (2013) (establishing the strength of protection the Contracts Clause initially gave
contracts); Michael B. Rappaport, Note, A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93
YALE L.J. 918, 918, 923-24 (1984) (proposing a Contracts Clause approach that prohibits a
state from altering a contract ex post without just compensation as consistent with the
Founders’ purpose).
193. See infra Part III.C. 
194. See infra Part III.C.
195. See infra Part IV.D. (noting the goal and structure of the proposal is based on con-
sensual contract modification).
2015] NEW FULCRUM POINT FOR CITY SURVIVAL 257
system supports restructuring officials in this pursuit by signaling
strength to the market. As noted above, my system is delineated
and provides a clear restructuring path. Restructuring officials re-
ceive the means to effect necessary structural changes. In crisis
situations, local officials are often associated with the problems
plaguing the municipality.196 My system minimizes their role.
Certainty, coupled with the potential for sustainable viability, will
ideally calm creditors and the credit markets.
5. Safeguard the Chapter 9 Option if Negotiations Fail
True deadlines with undesirable results open doors to negotiation.
As noted above, a Chapter 9 filing represents an undesirable result
to many municipal constituencies.197 Twenty-six states forbid cities
and counties from filing.198 Fourteen states attach conditions on a
filing or make the filing subject to specific approval by the governor
or other state official or agency.199 These states undermine debt
modification by empowering holdouts and relegating themselves to
the role of implicit guarantor of municipal debts and services.200
Under my proposal, restructuring officials have autonomy to au-
thorize a Chapter 9 filing if the negotiations required under the
system’s parameters prove fruitless. This option is subject to sat-
isfying a variety of negotiation prerequisites, but, once authorized,
cannot be altered by state officials or legislatures. This aspect,
coupled with the elimination of bailouts, brings holdouts to the
negotiating table.
With these five principles in mind—(1) achieving sustainable
viability, (2) establishing a proactive delineated system, (3) pre-
serving unilateral contract modification, (4) maintaining access to
credit markets, and (5) safeguarding the Chapter 9 option—the next
196. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining how local officials are incen-
tivized to overgraze at the debt commons, which leads to bankruptcy issues).
197. See supra Part II.B (discussing the cost, uncertainty, and history of public officials
using Chapter 9 to avoid consequences).
198. STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 9-10.
199. Id. Only ten states give municipalities discretion to file a Chapter 9 petition. See id.
200. Id. at 14-17 (explaining that such states intervene out of fear of stigma, contagion, a
state-wide credit downgrade, declines in public health and safety, and economic instability).
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Section discusses which party should be tasked with managing the
restructuring mechanism.
B. Managing the Restructuring Mechanism: State Primacy and
Reversing Devolution During Financial Distress
The term “devolution” describes a state’s delegation of power and
management of local affairs to municipalities and their residents.
This practice is the foundation of the “home rule” movement, which
seeks to “ensure[ ] that governmental power is exercised closest to
the people.”201 Devolution must be reversed during municipal finan-
cial distress.
As noted above, municipalities are plagued by cost shifting, and
policymakers are consumed with discovering ways to minimize this
practice.202 When a municipality is financially distressed, however,
cost shifting’s harm has already been realized, and the inquiry must
shift to determine which parties are in the best position to bear leg-
acy costs and prevent a financial crisis. Among all key constituen-
cies, states and state officials are best positioned and properly
incentivized to address municipal distress in an efficient, meaning-
ful, and sustainable manner.
States are primarily concerned with municipal distress due to
contagion risk.203 Not unlike individuals, states are “enormously
concerned with their credit rating.”204 A state’s credit rating affects
borrowing costs and access to credit. The rating holds enormous
implications for many key operational issues. Unfortunately, unlike
individuals, a subnational government’s debts and financial health
are extremely difficult to assess.205 As noted above, cost-shifting
practices abound, and the effects of these practices are not entirely
clear to lenders and bondholders. Consequently, perception plays a
201. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2259 (2003).
202. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 33, at 330 (summarizing his argument as an attempt to
get municipal residents and local officials to internalize the cost of their activities).
203. See STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 16.
204. Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 333; see also STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra
note 100, at 15-16; Gillette, supra note 33, at 304 (“[C]entralized governments that inter-
vene in the face of municipal fiscal distress are motivated largely by a perception of contagion
risk.”).
205. Gillette, supra note 33, at 303.
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large role in evaluating a state’s creditworthiness, which explains
contagion risk. Professor Gillette notes that “[i]n theory, contagion
should not occur because investors [and lenders] will distinguish
financially healthy jurisdictions from distressed ones.”206 But the
municipal borrower market is an opaque market characterized
by limited disclosure that precludes accurate risk assessment.207
Consequently, default risk is premised on a number of factors out-
side the state’s control. Standard & Poor’s, one of the preeminent
municipal debt rating agencies, considers local government financial
difficulties among its broad set of criteria for establishing a state’s
credit rating.208 Distress in one municipality can affect the credit
rating for other municipalities within that state and infect the state
itself. Various studies have reached inconsistent results, but there
is evidence that the contagion from New York City’s near default in
the 1970s affected borrowing costs for other local municipalities and
the state.209 Though this contagion effect may be temporary, the
phenomenon and its potential harm cannot be ignored.210
Furthermore, essential services customarily provided by munici-
palities, including fire, police, health, and safety services, are im-
plicitly guaranteed by the state. Distressed municipalities are often
unable to pay for essential services. Service interruptions create a
gaping hole into which the state is forced to plunge. As summarized
by Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett, “municipal governments
206. Id.
207. Id.; see also ANDREW ANG & RICHARD C. GREEN, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, LOWERING
BORROWING COSTS FOR STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES THROUGH COMMONMUNI 8-9 (2011),
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/aang/papers/THP%20ANG-GREEN%20DiscusPape_
Feb2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/62DA-5DWP].
208. See STANDARD & POOR’S, TOP 10 MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGHLY RATED
CREDITS IN U.S. PUBLIC FINANCE 1, 4 (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/fiscal/
Top10Management.pdf [http://perma.cc/W5V3-32E7] (“At the state level, we believe that local
government fiscal difficulties can increase and become a funding challenge for the state.”).
209. See Edward M. Gramlich, New York: Ripple or Tidal Wave? The New York City Fiscal
Crisis: What Happened and What Is to be Done?, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 415, 423-26 (1976). 
210. See David S. Kidwell & Charles A. Trzcinka, Municipal Bond Pricing and the New
York City Fiscal Crisis, 37 J. FINANCE 1239, 1246 (1982). Importantly, contagion also exists
in another context. Financial struggles and bankruptcy are particularly troubling for sub-
national governments. When a prominent city files for bankruptcy or is experiencing finan-
cial crisis, these events color the perception of that city, as well as surrounding cities and the
state in which that city is located. See STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100,
at 15-16. No state official wishes to be associated with this scarlet letter. 
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[should address] their own problems and com[e] together to develop
a fiscal recovery plan when necessary .... But when that fails to hap-
pen, the state has to take action to ensure public safety.”211 For ex-
ample, in 2011, the City of Camden, New Jersey was forced to cut
the city’s police force, which led to an increase in crime in the city.212
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie had no choice but to redirect
state troopers to patrol Camden to address the shortfall.213
States have also arguably guaranteed their municipalities’
pension obligations. As of 2008, “there [were] over 2,500 different
public employee retirement systems providing benefits to the over
20 million” public sector employees.214 Approximately “1,659 of
[these systems] are municipal, while 218 exist at the state level.”215
Government plans are not protected by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) or backstopped by the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation;216 thus, this burden could fall on the state.
And the burden is staggering. Pension systems are estimated to be
underfunded by as much as $4.4 trillion.217 Like any guarantor,
states are incentivized to ensure that the primary obligor does not
default on its obligations.218
Finally, the state is uniquely positioned to lead the restructuring
effort. State officials can facilitate necessary borrowing from the
credit markets and relax state law borrowing restrictions. The state
can allow the municipality to raise taxes or engage in revenue-
211. See Tara Leo Auchey, Governor Corbett Signs Senate Bill 1151, TODAY’S THE DAY
HARRISBURG (Oct. 20, 2011), http://todaysthedayhbg.com/governor-corbett-signs-senate-bill-
1151/ [http://perma.cc/WRQ4-MWWX].
212. See Press Release, State of N.J., Office of the Governor, Governor Chris Christie




214. John Beshears et al., Behavioral Economics Perspectives on Public Sector Pension
Plans 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16728, 2011) (citing data from
the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
215. Buck, supra note 29, at 43-44. 
216. See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 33, at 368. 
217. See Buck, supra note 29, at 27; see also Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 29, at 48.
218. New York City’s financial crisis in the 1970s provides another example. Putting aside
all the state had to provide to get the city through the crisis, in the years afterwards, the state
had to increase intergovernmental aid to the city, assume the costs of the city’s Medicaid
program and court system, and finance City University’s senior colleges. See SHEFTER, supra
note 7, at 137-38.
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generating practices that may otherwise be restricted under state
law. And state officials are best situated to understand macro trends
within state borders.
One key criticism of reversing devolution is that state officials’
intervention compromises the integrity of the local municipal
democracy.219 Unfortunately, this is a necessary evil during financial
distress. As we saw with New York City in the 1970s, local officials
are sometimes too beholden to local interests to effectuate necessary
change.220 Local officials may be “imperfect agents of their [own]
constituents” and are prone to “make decisions that serve personal
political objectives.”221 Painful resource adjustment is difficult to
achieve without abundant supplies of political will and political
capital. Consequently, local officials are often tempted to make ad-
justments at the periphery, which quickly devolves to cost shifting.
Political paralysis is common.222
Also, by the time a crisis materializes, local officials may be seen
as being so closely aligned with the political forces responsible for
the financial distress that current and prospective creditors may
balk at any continued involvement. This disapproval frustrates ne-
gotiations with current bondholders and employees, and it may
restrict access to credit markets.
Fundamentally, destabilizing financial distress is a complex prob-
lem demanding expertise that local officials rarely possess.223 Local
officials often have had many years to try to address structural
problems. Affording these officials additional time is potentially
irrational. Finally, the threat of reversing devolution serves as
another means to encourage local officials to internalize the benefits
and costs of their actions.224
219. My proposal attempts to limit the effect of this compromise by including various elect-
ed officials in the restructuring process. See infra Part IV.C.2.
220. See LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 1, at 118.
221. See Gillette, supra note 33, at 286.
222. Political paralysis is common for other reasons as well. Many agencies and officials
that contribute to a municipality’s financial distress are not subject to control by the munic-
ipality. These actors, such as health and human service agencies, impose costs on a munici-
pality’s budget, but are subject to state control. 
223. I acknowledge that, in many cases, state officials may be no more knowledgeable or
effective than local officials, but I assert that they most often represent the greatest likelihood
for a successful restructuring.
224. Other constituencies are also ill-suited to monitor or guide a restructuring process.
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C. Addressing the Contracts Clause
A properly functioning debt adjustment mechanism will primarily
reduce a municipality’s debt burden by targeting (1) labor costs and
benefits and (2) bondholder debt. I focus on these two debt classes
because they disproportionately affect a municipality’s capital struc-
ture.225 Even minor concessions within these classes can have a
significant effect on a municipality’s viability.
Not surprisingly, unilateral modification of these obligations is
extremely difficult. Historically, distressed subnational govern-
ments have attempted to alter or defer payment obligations related
to these two debt classes. Parties seeking to block these modifica-
tions have relied on state and federal constitutional provisions and
have enjoyed protection in the courts.226 Subnational governments
have perhaps overreacted to defeats and unwittingly abandoned
these battle lines. By conceding this high ground, however, dis-
tressed municipalities lack the leverage necessary to obtain mean-
ingful concessions in restructuring negotiations. This fact, coupled
with the disastrous dynamics that already exist in most states,
embolden holdouts.
In the following subsection, I argue that the Contracts Clause, as
it appears in the Constitution and various state constitutions, has
been widely misunderstood. In fact, by utilizing carefully tailored,
temporary contractual modifications, distressed municipalities
have far more leverage and bargaining power than they likely
suspect.
For instance, residents are transient, and because municipalities are not profit-generating
entities, residents—unlike shareholders—have little incentive to monitor them. Free riding
is therefore far more common. See Schragger, supra note 186, at 790-91. Creditors are theoret-
ically in a good position to curtail excessive risk-taking by restricting lending, but their mon-
itoring is incomplete because their only concern is debt repayment. They are also prone to
exploiting borrowers and other investors if information asymmetries exist. See id. at 790-92.
225. For example, salaries for employees of the City of Detroit constituted 50% of the
city’s operating expenses. Debt service was 16% of operating expenses. Pension contri-
butions represented 10% of operating expenses. And healthcare benefits for retirees were
approximately 18% of operating expenses. CITY OF DETROIT: PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS
44-50 (2013), http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20
Proposal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GGB-LB4X]. 
226. See Buck, supra note 29, at 28-29.
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1. A New Perspective on the Contracts Clause
The vast majority of states employ a contractual approach in pro-
tecting labor benefits and debt obligations owed to bondholders.227
This means that states view these debts as contractual obligations
even where benefits and entitlements are not specifically delineated
in a written agreement. Consequently, any attempt by a subnational
government228 to unilaterally modify labor benefits or bondholder
debt is subject to the Contracts Clause.
Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“[n]o State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts.”229 This seemingly rigid prohibition coupled with a host of
227. See Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege: Does State Law Facilitate
or Block Recent Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 179, 181 (2012). A few states safeguard employee pension benefits through other ap-
proaches: 
Connecticut, for example, ascribes to the proprietary approach. Under the
proprietary approach, public employees obtain a property interest in statutory
retirement benefits once they satisfy eligibility requirements; however, that
interest is only protected from arbitrary legislative action by due process ....
Minnesota adheres to the promissory estoppel approach .... The estoppel ap-
proach seeks to avoid injustice and focuses on the reasonableness of an em-
ployee’s reliance on the statutory benefit .... [P]ension benefits in states adopting
[these] approach[es] lack meaningful legal protection outside of truly arbitrary
action by the legislature.
Id. at 183-84. The gratuity approach has been adopted by Arkansas, Indiana, and Texas. Id.
at 185. Under this approach, certain labor benefits are “mere expectanc[ies], created by the
law, and liable to be revoked or destroyed by the same authority.” Id. at 184 (quoting Pennie
v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 471 (1889)). 
228. The Contracts Clause prohibition would arguably apply to state actors as well, and
it would presumably preclude state court judges from impairing state and municipal contracts
in instances when judicial action is ostensibly a substitute for legislation. See N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Contracts Clause’s intent and meaning are unclear.
The “social and political context of the clause reveals little about the intentions of the fram-
ers.” Epstein, supra note 192, at 706. The debates over the clause at the Constitutional
Convention were brief and inconclusive. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438
U.S. 234, 257 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Epstein, supra note 192, at 706-08; Merrill,
supra note 192, at 598-99. Furthermore, “not much more is to be gleaned from the historical
accounts of the debates at the drafting and ratifying conventions.” Epstein, supra note 192,
at 706. However, in those states in which the Clause was debated, it was understood to ensure
access to credit for states and their citizens. See Crump, supra note 192, at 693. During this
time, a preeminent problem was “the action of faithless states in trying to solve the problems
of postwar depression by allowing paper securities to become worthless and by abrogating
private contracts so as to benefit the abrogating states’ citizens at the expense of creditors.”
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undefined terms has fed a litany of scholarly debates regarding the
Clause’s intent, meaning, and scope.230 The Clause’s terse language
has also created a widely held misconception that the prohibition is
absolute.231 Fortunately, this scholarly cacophony dissipates within
the judiciary. Contracts Clause jurisprudence has evolved slowly,
but most courts have coalesced around key tenets. Courts have
acknowledged that the Constitution is not a suicide pact,232 and case
law has been surprisingly uniform on the Clause’s primary facets
and exceptions, offering municipal debtors a surprising degree of
bargaining leverage with unions and bondholders.
Id. at 691. Indeed, states had engaged in “an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the
defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations. Legislative interferences had
been so numerous ... that the confidence essential to prosperous trade had been undermined
and the utter destruction of credit was threatened.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 427 (1934). These types of opportunistic defaults and rent-seeking activities were
perpetrated by a small subset of subnational borrowers. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 192,
at 713 n.28. Nevertheless, the effect of these defaults on the market was significant, causing
lenders to frequently charge usurious rates of interest or deny states and their residents
access to credit. See Crump, supra note 192, at 690-91. Many states saw contract enforcement
as a means to ensure capital availability. See id.
230. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 192, at 689-91; Epstein, supra note 192, at 706-08; Kmiec
& McGinnis, supra note 192, at 525-27; Merrill, supra note 192, at 598-99; Palmer, supra note
192, at 631; see also Cataldo, supra note 192, at 1145-46; Rappaport, supra note 192, at 918-
19.
231. Some scholars have argued that the Clause was intended to be an absolute bar on
retroactive and prospective state impairment of private and public contracts. See Epstein,
supra note 192, at 706-07; Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 192, at 526; Palmer, supra note
192, at 635-36; Rappaport, supra note 192, at 923-24. But this position is difficult to reconcile
with the historical record. There was a distinct lack of debate regarding the Clause at the
Constitutional Convention. See Epstein, supra note 192, at 706. But if the Clause was to be
applied literally, curtailment of state power would be severe. It is reasonable to expect that
a sweeping impairment of this kind would have garnered more debate. Further, as noted
above, in states that did debate the Clause—including South Carolina, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and Virginia—the Clause was seen as addressing opportunistic defaults of the kind
that had proliferated during that time and affected credit availability. See Crump, supra note
192, at 693-94. The Clause was not seen as superseding a state’s basic police power to regu-
late private abuses or ensure the viability of the sovereign. See id. at 690. An argument can
be made that, despite its language, the Clause’s scope is circumscribed, as evidenced by the
nominal discussion prior to ratification.
232. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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2. The Federal Judiciary’s Approach to the Contracts Clause
Shortly after ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
was tasked with resolving the Contracts Clause’s apparent am-
biguity. The initial resolution promoted a “muscular restraint on
state authority.”233 In a series of cases beginning in 1810, the Court
staked out clear parameters by (1) interpreting the term “contract”
broadly, (2) applying the Clause to both private contracts between
individuals and public contracts between the state and individuals,
and (3) adopting a near absolute prohibition on contract impairment
by interpreting the term “impair” as equivalent to “alter.”234 The
Court, led by Justice Marshall, used a firm hand to develop an
unquestioned prohibition.235 In the process, the Court affirmed the
sanctity of contracts and supported the fledgling nation’s market
economy.236
But the Clause’s ascension during this time represented the peak
of its restraining power. A more stable nation prompted the Court
to consider if there were exceptions to the Clause. In 1848, the
Court acknowledged that there had to be a subset of state powers
that were not subject to the Clause.237 In West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, the Court held that every contract is made in subordination
to a state’s right of eminent domain.238 In Stone v. Mississippi, the
Court created what would become the reserved powers doctrine.239
In that case, the Mississippi legislature granted a charter to the
Mississippi Agricultural and Manufacturing Aid Society (Mississippi
Agricultural) that allowed it to conduct a lottery for a period of
twenty-five years.240 However, the state adopted a constitution the
233. James W. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV.
371, 374 (2010).
234. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518 (1819); Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. 164,
167 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 89 (1810); see also Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note
192, at 535-37. 
235. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 192, at 535-40. 
236. See Ely, supra note 233, at 374.
237. See W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1848).
238. Id.
239. 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879). The reserved powers doctrine describes the proposition that
a state may not enter a contract that “surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty.”
U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977).
240. Stone, 101 U.S. at 814-15.
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following year that prohibited state lotteries and the sale of lottery
tickets.241 Mississippi Agricultural brought suit, arguing that its
charter represented a contract that was insulated from state
alteration by the Contracts Clause.242
In rejecting Mississippi Agricultural’s argument, the Court carved
out another exception to the Contracts Clause. The Court explained
that no legislature could “curtail the power of its successors to make
such laws as they may deem proper in matters of police.”243 In other
words, the states had sovereign powers as to certain matters that
could not be released by contract or bound by the Contracts Clause.
With this ruling, the Court created a formidable exception. The
Court noted that the exception certainly encompassed matters
affecting the public health or morals, but also stated that other
actions could be affected.244 Jurists would have to determine on a
case-by-case basis if the exception applied.245
The Clause’s deterioration continued into the twentieth century
and culminated with Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.246
In the midst of the Great Depression, the Minnesota legislature re-
cognized that a severe financial and economic cataclysm was threat-
ening farmers, businesses, and property owners.247 The legislature
declared a state of emergency and passed legislation that ostensibly
created a two-year moratorium on the foreclosure of a variety of
mortgages.248 The legislation did not impair the integrity of the
mortgage indebtedness, and mortgagees received a nominal rental
payment during the moratorium.249 The legislation was challenged
as violating the Contracts Clause.
241. Id. at 815. 
242. Id. at 816.
243. Id. at 818. 
244. Id.
245. See id. 
246. See 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
247. Id. at 421 n.3. 
248. Id. Naturally, this legislation assisted homeowners, but it also arguably assisted lend-
ers. This ruling avoided the collective action problem that would have invariably arisen.
Without the legislation, lenders would have rushed to foreclose on properties—acting in a
manner that best suited their individual objectives. But a significant number of lenders would
have sought to promptly resell the foreclosed property. These turnaround sales would have
accelerated the decline in real property prices and created a glut in the market. The lenders,
as a collective body, would have suffered. 
249. Id. at 425.
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In addressing the primary issue on appeal, the Court clarified
that the prohibition found in the Contracts Clause was “not an
absolute one and [could not] ... be read with [the] literal exactness
of a mathematical formula.”250 In exploring the contours of the
Clause, the Court explained that states are empowered to safeguard
their residents’ vital interests.251 “It does not matter that legislation
appropriate to that end ‘has the result of modifying or abrogating
contracts already in effect.’ ... [T]he reservation of essential at-
tributes of sovereign power is ... read into contracts as a postulate
of the legal order.”252 The Court then cited Stone and noted that this
reservation of power had been recognized in instances affecting
public health and safety.253 But the power extended further, and the
state’s economic interests could justify the exercise of its police
power notwithstanding the interference with existing contracts.254
The Court explained that the constitutional prohibition could not be
construed as restricting limited and temporary contractual modifica-
tions necessitated by fiscal emergencies.255
With this foundation, the Court concluded that the legislation
was constitutional because (1) an economic emergency existed in
Minnesota, (2) the legislation addressed an emergency related to a
basic interest of society and was not for the mere advantage of par-
ticular individuals, (3) the moratorium was appropriately tailored
to the emergency that it was designed to meet, (4) the imposed con-
ditions were reasonable, and (5) the impairment was temporary.256
In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that the Minnesota
legislature had determined that there was a true emergency, and
the Court would defer to that assessment.257 The Court did not
indicate that this deference would change in any way if the state
had been a party to the contracts at issue. This opinion and the
Court’s dispositive factors are the foundation for current Contracts
Clause jurisprudence.
250. Id. at 428. 
251. Id. at 434.
252. Id. at 434-35 (quoting Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276 (1932)). 
253. Id. at 436. 
254. Id. at 437. 
255. Id. at 439.
256. See id. at 444-47. 
257. Id. at 444.
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Subsequent years yielded additional rulings that reaffirmed
the exceptions to the Clause.258 In 1977, the Court revisited the
Clause in U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey.259 In the early 1960s, the
New Jersey Port Authority (NJPA) was experiencing financial
distress and had difficulty accessing the credit markets.260 In an
effort to boost investor confidence, the state passed legislation that
provided new bondholders a dedicated revenue stream to satisfy
bond obligations.261 This was accomplished in part by precluding the
NJPA from diverting revenue from the general fund to a variety of
unapproved purposes.262 The covenant helped the NJPA gain access
to the bond markets, but soon proved to be a significant hindrance
to various state transportation policy objectives. Consequently, in
1974, the state chose to retroactively repeal the covenant.263 A
trustee for a group of bondholders brought suit, arguing that the
state had violated the Contracts Clause.264 The Court agreed.265
The Court struck down the state statute finding that there
was no emergency motivating the legislation, but the impair-
ment was significant and represented a total repudiation.266
Further, a less drastic modification could have been pursued. The
Court moved away from the Blaisdell Court’s high-deference ap-
proach to the state legislature’s assessment of reasonableness and
necessity, and noted that, because the state held a vested interest
as a party to the contract, complete deference to the legislature’s
assessment of reasonableness and necessity would not be appro-
priate.267 Ultimately, the Court held that the state could not refuse
258. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Gelfert v. Nat’l City Bank,
313 U.S. 221, 235 (1941); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
259. See 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
260. See id. at 8-9. 
261. See id. at 9.
262. See id. at 9-10. 
263. See id. at 13-14.
264. Id. at 1.
265. Id. at 26, 32.
266. Id. at 25-29.
267. See id. at 25-26. Blaisdell prescribed a specific approach in evaluating a request
to unilaterally modify a contract exclusively between private parties. Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 407 (1934). U.S. Trust involved contracts between private
parties and the state, which can be described as “public contracts.” See U.S. Tr., 431 U.S. at
17, 45 n.13 (1977). In addressing the unilateral modification of a public contract, courts still
follow the approach formulated by the Blaisdell court, but afford less deference to the
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to meet legitimate financial obligations simply because it would
prefer to spend the money to support some public good.268 However,
in reaffirming the—albeit diminished—power of the Contracts
Clause, the Court promoted the criteria promulgated by the
Blaisdell Court as the appropriate methodology for Contracts
Clause interpretation.269
The following year, the Court heard Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spanaus.270 In that case, the plaintiff (Allied Structural) was an
Illinois corporation with a small office in Minnesota.271 The company
offered employees a pension plan, but the plan did not require the
company to make specific contributions and there were no sanctions
for a failure to fully fund the plan.272 The company retained the
right to amend the plan and terminate it at any time.273 In 1974,
Minnesota passed legislation that stated that a qualifying private
employer that provided pension benefits under a qualifying plan
was subject to a pension funding charge if it terminated the plan
or closed its Minnesota office.274 Allied Structural closed its Minne-
sota office shortly thereafter, and the state assessed a $185,000
funding charge.275 The company argued that the legislation violated
the Contracts Clause.276
In its ruling, the Court reiterated that the Contracts Clause is not
absolute and cannot eviscerate a state’s police power.277 The Court
endorsed the Blaisdell criteria for evaluating state action under the
Contracts Clause but added an additional facet. The Court noted
that the initial inquiry in such cases:
state legislature’s assessments regarding the need for the modification. However, “‘less
deference does not imply no deference.” Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 370 (2d
Cir. 2006). This is the only material difference in addressing private and public contracts. 
268. U.S. Tr., 431 U.S. at 29.
269. See id. at 15. Scholars have attacked the U.S. Trust opinion on a number of bases, in-
cluding that it fails to respect the Clause’s original intent. See, e.g., Cataldo, supra note 192,
at 1146. These criticisms, however, are generally outside the scope of this Article.
270. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
271. Id. at 236.
272. Id. at 237.
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 238. 
275. Id. at 239.
276. Id. at 239-40.
277. Id. at 241.
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must be whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.... Minimal
alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its
first stage. Severe impairment ... will push the inquiry to a care-
ful examination of the nature and purpose of the state legisla-
tion.278
After determining that the impairment at issue was severe, the
Court moved through the Blaisdell criteria, finding the legislation
deficient from all perspectives.279 In striking down the legislation,
the Court noted that the law was not enacted to deal with a wide-
spread emergency or economic problem.280 Further, the law caused
a severe, retroactive, permanent, and immediate change in contrac-
tual relationships.281 The Court concluded that even a diminished
Contracts Clause prohibited the legislation at issue.282
This triumvirate shaped Contracts Clause jurisprudence through
the twentieth century. Modern Contracts Clause cases, discussed
below, have expanded on a variety of fundamental principles in a
manner favorable to distressed municipalities.
In Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a temporary modification of a
union contract was permissible.283 In that case, Baltimore had unex-
pectedly lost $13.3 million in state aid.284 In response, the city im-
plemented a temporary furlough plan under which essentially all
city employees lost the annual equivalent of 2.5 days, or 0.95% of
their gross annual salary.285 The plan saved the city $2 million.286
Unions representing city teachers and police officers filed a com-
plaint arguing that the city’s action violated the Contracts Clause.287
The federal district court agreed.288
278. Id. at 244-45. 
279. Id. at 247, 250.
280. Id. at 250. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. at 250-51.
283. 6 F.3d 1012, 1022 (4th Cir. 1993).
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit applied the three-part test pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court in Blaisdell, U.S. Trust, and Allied
(the “Blaisdell Three-Part Test”).289 The circuit court found that
the plan represented an actual impairment of a contract and that
the impairment was substantial.290 Therefore, the city’s action was
subject to the Contracts Clause.291 The final step in the test was
determining whether the action was a reasonable exercise of the
state’s sovereign power.292 To do this, the court considered the
Blaisdell criteria.293 The circuit court found that the criteria insu-
lated the city’s plan from constitutional attack.294 Most notably, the
court explained that it would defer to the state legislature’s
assessment of three issues, whether: (1) some legitimate public
purpose existed, (2) the action taken was necessary to address this
purpose, and (3) the action was reasonable in light of the surround-
ing circumstances.295 The court deemed this deference appropriate
even when public contracts are involved.296 The court explained:
The authority of the states to impair contracts, to be sure, must
be constrained in some meaningful way. The Contract Clause,
however, does not require the courts—even where public con-
tracts have been impaired—to sit as superlegislatures, de-
termining, for example, whether it would have been more
appropriate instead for Baltimore to close its schools for a week
... or to reduce funding to the arts .... Not only are we ill-
equipped even to consider the evidence that would be relevant
to such conflicting policy alternatives; we have no objective
standards against which to assess the merit of the multitude of
alternatives.297
Perhaps even more significant than the court’s deferential analy-
sis was its opinion on unilateral contract modification during times
of economic distress. The court stated that “[p]ublic employees—
289. Id. at 1015.
290. Id. at 1015-16, 1018.
291. See id. at 1018.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 1019-21.
294. See id. at 1021-22.
295. See id. at 1015.
296. Id. at 1019.
297. Id. at 1021-22 (quoting E. N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234 (1945)).
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federal or state—by definition serve the public and their expecta-
tions are necessarily defined, at least in part, by the public interest.
[And it] should not be wholly unexpected ... that these public ser-
vants might well be called upon to sacrifice first when the public
interest demands sacrifice.”298
Both the First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeal have sub-
scribed to this approach. In Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe, the
Second Circuit addressed a Contracts Clause challenge to a city-
imposed wage freeze on ostensibly all city employees.299 In 2003, the
City of Buffalo was experiencing significant financial distress.300
The New York State Legislature created the Buffalo Fiscal Author-
ity (BFA), a public benefit corporation tasked with stabilizing the
city’s finances.301 The BFA approved a four-year restructuring plan
for Buffalo.302 But within a year, the Authority learned that the
city’s financial situation had deteriorated significantly and
unexpectedly.303 In response, the BFA instituted a wage freeze with
respect to city employees.304 The freeze was not permanent but,
subject to the BFA’s discretion, would stay in place as long as the
city’s significant instability persisted.305 The city unions argued that
the freeze violated the Contracts Clause.306 Surprisingly, the Second
Circuit explained that the state would not be held liable for
violating the Contracts Clause unless the plaintiffs were able to
produce evidence that the state’s self-interest motivated its
conduct.307 On this issue, the plaintiffs bore the burden of proof.308
In upholding the BFA’s action, the Second Circuit followed the
Blaisdell Three-Part Test and the Baltimore Teachers Union court’s
rationale. The court deferred to the state legislature’s conclusions
regarding the city’s fiscal crisis and the necessity and reasonable-
ness of the wage freeze.309 The court noted that the state legislature
298. Id. at 1021. 
299. See 464 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2006). 
300. Id. at 365.
301. Id. at 365-66.
302. Id. at 366.
303. See id.
304. Id. at 366-67.
305. Id. at 371.
306. Id. at 367.
307. Id. at 365.
308. Id. The court did not cite any authority for this approach.
309. Id. at 370-71.
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would be afforded less deference because a public contract was at is-
sue; however, “less deference [did] not imply no deference.”310 The
court acknowledged that it could not analyze all factors underlying
the legislation at issue and make an independent determination
that a better statutory solution existed.311 Ultimately, the court
concluded that a review of the Blaisdell criteria established that the
action was a reasonable exercise of the state’s sovereign power.312
In UAW v. Fortuno, the First Circuit continued the evolution of
Contracts Clause jurisprudence.313 In 2009, Puerto Rico declared a
fiscal state of emergency.314 As a cost-saving measure, the legisla-
ture implemented a multi-phase plan to reduce the government
payroll.315 For a period of two years, the plan froze employee salaries
and suspended a number of employee benefits and protections.316
National and local labor unions brought suit alleging, inter alia,
that the plan violated the Contracts Clause.317 The district court
dismissed the Contracts Clause claim, finding that the plaintiffs had
failed to sufficiently allege that the plan’s impairment was unrea-
sonable or unnecessary to an important government interest.318
On appeal, the First Circuit analyzed the burden-of-proof issue
raised by the Second Circuit in Buffalo Teachers Federation.319 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs had the burden of proof as to the
necessity and reasonableness of the state action.320 The court
explained that:
To demand that the state prove reasonableness and necessity
would force governments to endure costly discovery each time
a plaintiff advance[d] a plausible allegation of a substantial
impairment, even where that plaintiff cannot allege a single fact
to question the reasonableness or necessity of the impairment.
This would not only financially burden states, it would likely
310. Id. at 370.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 376.
313. 633 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). 
314. Id. at 39.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 39-40. 
317. See id. at 40.
318. Id.
319. See id. at 42-44.
320. Id. at 42.
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discourage legislative action impacting public contracts. Such a
result is particularly undesirable in today’s fiscal environment,
where many states face daunting budget deficits that may neces-
sitate decisive and dramatic action.321
The court evaluated the Blaisdell criteria and ultimately upheld the
dismissal of the plaintiff’s Contracts Clause claims.322
3. Distilling Contracts Clause Jurisprudence to Understand a
Distressed Municipality’s Bargaining Position
One of the most startling aspects of modern Contracts Clause juris-
prudence is that it demonstrates a shift in the national consciousness
321. Id. at 43. 
322. Id. at 47. Some state constitutions contain the state’s own contracts clause, but these
provisions invariably mirror the federal Constitution’s Contracts Clause, and the standard
of review is identical for both. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 753 (2009)
(“Generally, the federal and state constitutional guarantees against the impairment of con-
tractual obligations are interpreted essentially identically and given the same effect.”); Amy
B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and its Impact on Public Pension
Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1040 (2012); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Ill.
Commerce Comm’n, 924 N.E.2d 1065, 1085 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (observing that there does
not appear to be any indication that the federal and state contracts clauses should be
analyzed differently); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Milliken, 367 N.W. 2d. 1, 13 (Mich. 1985)
(expressly adopting the U.S. Supreme Court standard for analyzing Contracts Clause claims
under its own constitution); Fid. Union Tr. Co. v. N.J. Highway Auth., 426 A.2d 488, 500 (N.J.
1981) (recognizing that the state and federal versions of the Contracts Clause provide
“parallel guarantees”); Parsonese v. Midland Nat’l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814, 818 (Pa. 1998)
(adopting Blaisdell five-factor test in determining if legislation violated a state contracts
clause provision); Burns v. Pub. Ct. Emps. Ret. Bd., 853 A.2d 1146, 1154 n.13 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2004) (“Generally, our review of a challenge raising the impairment of contracts provision
[sic] of the Pennsylvania Constitution depends on the federal standard.”); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 187 S.W.3d 808, 824 (Tex. App. 2006) (finding that the state’s
contracts clause mirrors the federal version). Generally speaking, few states have state
supreme court precedent or a developed body of lower court case law that provides that its
state contracts clause provision is more circumscribed than the federal provision or that the
bar is absolute. Florida is the only exception. In that state, lower courts have ruled that the
state contracts clause may actually be less accommodating to states than its federal counter-
part. See Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Busey Bank, N.A., 30 So. 3d 579, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010); Lee Cty. v. Brown, 929 So. 2d 1202, 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Sarasota Cty. v.
Andrews, 573 So. 2d 113, 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). However, the state supreme court has
not necessarily endorsed this approach. The court last commented on the issue almost thirty-
five years ago. See Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condo., 378 So. 2d 774, 780 (Fla. 1979)
(stating that when considering whether an impairment is permissible, the degree of
contractual impairment must be weighed against the source of the state’s power and the evil
the impairment seeks to remedy).
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on issues of unilateral contract modification. Naturally, overcoming
contractual and constitutional restrictions on unilateral contract
modification remains extremely difficult. But judicial perspective is
evolving as parties begin to acknowledge that current legislatures
cannot prevent future legislatures from using their police power to
protect residents during fiscal emergencies.323 Further, holding
states and municipalities to debt and pension plan structures “that
were conceived many years ago in different financial and labor mar-
ket conditions” only serves to impede municipalities’ ability to
address systemic financial deficiencies effectively to the detriment
of all constituencies.324 This shift in judicial perspective has already
occurred in business bankruptcy cases.325
Certainly, variances exist in the manner circuit courts of appeal
have approached Contracts Clause challenges to state legislation.
Scholarly debate on these variances is thought-provoking but ulti-
mately irrelevant. Indeed, the precise application of the Blaisdell
Three-Part Test has little bearing on the primary thrust of my debt
adjustment mechanism. I am unconcerned with a municipality’s
likelihood of prevailing at the end of some years-long litigation
323. See, e.g., Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d
618, 635 (Tex. 1996) (“[A]n exercise of the police power necessary to safeguard the public
safety and welfare can justify the impairment of contractual rights and obligations.”).
324. Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN.
& POL’Y 617, 645 (2010). A number of modern cases have struck down state action as violative
of the Contracts Clause, but in these cases there was clearly no fiscal emergency or legitimate
public interest at stake. See, e.g., S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 897 (9th
Cir. 2003); Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1998); Nev.
Emp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1990). This deficiency provides the
basis for overturning state action. These opinions do not undermine the circuit rulings in
Baltimore Teachers Union, Buffalo Teachers Federation, or Fortuno discussed above. 
325. See, e.g., In re Chi. Constr. Specialties, Inc., 510 B.R. 205, 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014)
(allowing a liquidating debtor to reject its collective bargaining agreements); In re Patriot Coal
Corp., 493 B.R. 65, 140 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013) (debtors allowed to reject collective bargaining
agreement based on union’s refusal of necessary changes); In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463,
2012 WL 3834798 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2012) (debtor allowed to reject collective bar-
gaining agreement with its pilots); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., 359 B.R. 468, 489 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006) (balance of the equities favored rejection of pilots’ collective bargaining
agreement); Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 350 B.R.
435, 465 (D. Minn. 2006) (debtor authorized to reject its collective bargaining agreements);
In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 331 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (allowing debtor to reject
flight attendants’ collective bargaining agreement); In re U.S. Airways, No. 04-13819, 2004
WL 2578966 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2004) (allowing for rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ment). 
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process. The fulcrum is not whether the threat of unilateral mod-
ification has a likelihood of success. Rather, the fulcrum is whether
the threat is plausible. As explored above, the threat is plausible for
many distressed municipalities depending on the type of state
action to be pursued. Indeed, Contracts Clause jurisprudence pro-
vides key tenets. The Contracts Clause is not absolute.326 Minor
contractual modifications may not even implicate the Clause.327
Further, even substantial impairments328 may not violate the
Clause if a true fiscal emergency exists or legitimate public interest
is implicated.329 Modifications that are temporary, appropriately tai-
lored to address the emergency at hand, and reasonable in light of
the surrounding circumstances are generally protected from consti-
tutional attack.330 Perhaps most importantly, courts will defer to
state legislatures on these issues. This deference is appropriate even
when a public contract is at issue. Finally, due to the nature of these
disputes, the burden of proof may be on the party challenging state
action.
The distillation of these cases is nothing short of a revelation for
subnational officials. Indeed, to the extent a state provides a proper
debt adjustment mechanism, municipalities that appreciate the
nuances of precedent and shifting opinion within the judiciary have
a host of restructuring opportunities. Of course, my system’s ulti-
mate goal is to achieve consensual—not unilateral—modifications.331
But, as noted above, consensual modifications cannot be realized un-
less the state has sufficient bargaining leverage. This methodology
is the means to address the holdout problem without resorting to a
federal bankruptcy process that drains resources, creates constitu-
tional quandaries, demoralizes the municipality, and yields poorly
formed results.332
326. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 209 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
327. Id. at 439.
328. A “substantial impairment” is one in which the legislation at issue “detrimentally
affects the financial framework which induced the [lenders] to originally [enter into the
transaction], without providing alternative or additional security.” See, e.g., Pierce Cty. v.
State, 148 P.3d 1002, 1011 (Wash. 2006). 
329. Blaisdell, 209 U.S. at 439.
330. Id. at 444.
331. Naturally, consensual modifications are not subject to the Contracts Clause. 
332. Some states, most notably New York, have explicit constitutional provisions that
“provide that [pension] rights are fixed as of the date the employee enters the retirement sys-
tem and cannot thereafter be diminished or impaired.” Monahan, supra note 324, at 622.
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IV. THE NUANCES OF AN OPTIMAL STATE DEBT ADJUSTMENT
MECHANISM
The previous section lays the foundation and outlines the frame-
work for my debt adjustment mechanism. The discussion that fol-
lows provides the detailed stages of my normative approach.
A. Stage One: Soft Monitoring’s Scarecrow
Most states are not aware of local government fiscal difficulties
until a true crisis has materialized.333 According to a recent survey
of states, only fifteen states monitored local government financial
conditions using indicator criteria.334 Delayed intervention leaves
state and local officials with circumscribed restructuring options.
My normative approach begins with soft monitoring that seeks to
identify municipalities engaging in fiscal pollution. Municipalities
will be required to send key financial data and audits to a state
agency or state officials throughout the year.335 The review will
identify financial dynamics unique to the municipality and macro
trends that could affect the municipality’s stability. Financial
dynamics include short-term debt, cash flow, year-end fund balance,
operating deficits, fixed costs, and whether tax limits are being
respected. The review would also consider macro trends, including
population loss and migration trends, decline in home prices, loss of
intergovernmental aid, residents’ age, business movement and
factory closures, unemployment, and poverty levels. The ultimate
Other labor provisions are not similarly protected. 
333. See Honadle, supra note 106, at 1431-61.
334. See Kloha et al., supra note 106, at 240, 252.
335. In Florida, local governments are required to hire independent certified public
accountants to review municipal finances, but the infidelity of the credit rating agencies in
the 2000s demonstrates that auditors can be conflicted in these scenarios. See Deryn Darcy,
Note, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer Pays” Conflict Contributed
and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 605, 642-43 (2009).
Consequently, a more reasoned approach is for the state to appoint the auditor. North
Carolina requires local governments to submit financial data extracted from state-mandated
reports prepared by independent auditors. See STANDARD & POOR’S, NORTH CAROLINA’S LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS REMAIN FISCALLY HEALTHY DESPITE THE RECENT RECESSION 1, 3 (2013), http://
www.huntersville.org/Portals/0/Finance/North%20Carolina%20SP%20Report.pdf [http://
perma.cc/E8W6-HHDG].
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inquiry is whether the municipality can service its debt while
providing key services to residents in an optimal manner.336
In most cases, soft monitoring will be sufficient to deter excessive
cost shifting. Studies demonstrate that people modify their behavior
if they believe they are being monitored, even if the monitor cannot
take any action against them.337 Imagine that an individual is
driving a car at a speed that is twenty miles above the posted speed
limit. As she turns a corner, she sees a machine on the side of the
road that displays her speed below a sign that shows the legal speed
limit on the street. The driver is likely to materially adjust her
speed even if she does not believe that a police officer is in the
area.338 Similarly, soft monitoring’s scarecrow will increase the
likelihood that local officials will internalize the costs and benefits
of their decisions, even if they do not believe that state overseers are
actively reviewing submitted financial data.339
Soft monitoring’s final product is a general classification of all
municipalities within the state. Municipalities with the most
troubled fiscal architecture would be designated as “pressured.”
Pressured municipalities would be notified and graduate to a hard
monitoring system with financial triggers.
336. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, FISCAL STRESS MONITORING SYSTEM
(Apr. 2014), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/fiscalmonitoring/pdf/fiscalstressmonitor
ing.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8B2-DJ2K].
337. See Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-
World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 413 (2006). 
338. See id. 
339. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created the Fi-
nancial Stability Oversight Council (the “Council”). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-94 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). The Council includes the chairs of the Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors, the FDIC, the SEC, and the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. Among their many duties,
Council members are required to annually certify to Congress that: “[T]he Council, the Gov-
ernment and the private sector are taking all reasonable steps to ensure financial stability
and to mitigate systemic risk that would negatively affect the economy.” Id. § 112(b)(1). If
Council members are unable to make this certification, they need to state what additional
steps should be taken to ensure financial stability. Id. § 112(b)(2). States could require local
comptrollers to make a similar statement to accompany year-end audits. For example, a local
comptroller could be required to either (1) certify to the state legislature that his or her office
is taking all reasonable steps to ensure the municipality’s ability to provide essential services
to its residents and pay debts as they come due, or (2) explain what additional steps need to
be taken in order to ensure service delivery and debt payment. 
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B. Stage Two: Financial Triggers
In stage two, pressured municipalities will be analyzed to de-
termine if they are deteriorating to a fiscally distressed level. As
noted above, a successful debt adjustment mechanism must be
proactive—identifying distressed municipalities early, and acting
aggressively to avoid a crisis and preserve restructuring options.
Monitoring coupled with financial triggers is essential to this pro-
cess. Because we are attempting to identify municipalities at an ear-
lier stage of financial deterioration, relying exclusively on customary
red flags—including payment defaults—is ineffective; they repre-
sent symptoms of a disease that has already proliferated.
States would need to formulate their own lists of financial trig-
gers, but they should incorporate a collection from the following
criteria:
(1) the municipality’s credit rating has been downgraded;
(2) the municipality executed an intra-fund transfer that sug-
gests a deficit somewhere in the budget;340
(3) the municipality failed to file timely financial reports;
(4) a major employer located within the municipality has closed
an office or significantly downsized its operations;
(5) the municipality failed to transfer taxes withheld on em-
ployee income or employer and employee contributions for a pen-
sion, retirement, or benefit plan;
(6) the municipality’s mandated audit report shows funds with
deficit fund balances;
(7) local officials have failed to correct problems—including in-
ternal control problems—after being notified by state officials;
(8) the municipality has insufficient cash to meet required pay-
roll payments in a timely manner;
(9) the municipality has violated a covenant in its credit agree-
ments;
(10) the municipality has recognized sizeable losses as a result
of unnecessarily aggressive investment practices;
(11) the municipality has expended restricted funds in violation
of applicable terms and provisions;
340. For example, in fiscal year 2011, Minneapolis moved approximately $1.8 million from
its general contingency fund to the fire and police departments to avoid cutting staff or closing
stations. See THE LOCAL SQUEEZE, supra note 46, at 18.
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(12) the ending balance in the municipality’s general fund has
declined for two consecutive years;
(13) the municipality is experiencing significant service delivery
interruptions;
(14) the municipality faces the likelihood of a default on debt
payments or an inability to pay vendors, employees, or creditors
with uncontested claims; and
(15) the municipality has experienced high levels of revenue in-
efficiency.341
No combination of triggers equals fiscal distress. State officials
must qualitatively analyze triggers that apply to determine if the
proper course is additional monitoring or intervention.
C. Stage Three: Reversing Devolution During Municipal Distress
Intervention is necessary where the state determines that a mu-
nicipality is or will be unable to fulfill its financial obligations while
still providing key services to residents in an optimal manner.342 As
discussed above, at this stage, devolution is reversed because the
state is best situated to oversee this restructuring process. But this
intervention can come in a variety of forms.
1. The Poles in the Local Governance Spectrum
There exists a spectrum for local governance. As discussed above,
at one end is the home rule paradigm where local officials manage
and direct governmental functions, theoretically acting as directly
accountable agents for municipal residents.343 The state receiver344
is at the other end of the spectrum.
A receiver is an individual appointed under state law to assume
fundamental decision-making authority from local officials, which
341. For example, state officials would compare all state municipalities’ tax rates with their
respective revenue yields. Those with the largest discrepancies could be considered to be oper-
ating the least efficiently. 
342. For purposes of potential unilateral contract modification, the state legislature should
authorize intervention only after declaring that the municipality is experiencing a fiscal emer-
gency. 
343. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
344. Sometimes referred to as an “emergency manager.” 
2015] NEW FULCRUM POINT FOR CITY SURVIVAL 281
arguably undermines democratic decision making. The receiver is
appointed by an elected official or a group of elected officials.345 In
many cases, the appointment of a receiver will precipitate the
removal of key local officials.346 The receiver and her team bear lit-
tle responsibility to residents.347 Indeed, receivers often employ
measures that were previously rejected by local officials as being
harmful to the local community and its residents.348 For example,
under Michigan state law, the governor is empowered to appoint a
receiver—referred to as an “emergency manager”—for financially
distressed municipalities.349 The receiver is instructed to “act for and
in the place and stead of the governing body and the chief adminis-
trative officer of the local government.”350 Further, local government
officials may not exercise the powers of their office without the
receiver’s express written approval.351 The state statute delineates
that some actions are excluded from this restriction, but the state
receiver may still place conditions as to those exempted actions.352
The receiver is empowered to issue orders to elected and appointed
local officials.353 Failure to adhere to the receiver’s orders can be
grounds for a local official to be barred from his or her government
office, email, and internal information systems.354
But the flaws of the receiver model go further.355 Indeed, creating
a dictator-like figure in charge of expenditures, budgets, and prior-
ities within each budget may be misguided. One person can be sub-
ject to the same personal political failings as local officials. In fact,
receivers present an even heightened risk of capture and self-
dealing due to the almost unilateral power they enjoy and the speed
with which transactions are executed.356 For example, receivers of-
ten deal with private companies that represent attractive future
employers or clients:
345. See Kossis, supra note 104, at 1110.
346. See id.
347. See id. at 1121-23.
348. See id. at 1134-35.
349. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(1) (2012).
350. Id. § 141.1549(2).
351. Id.
352. Id. 
353. Id. § 141.1550(1) (2012).
354. Id. § 141.1550(2).
355. See Anderson, supra note 166, at 604-10.
356. See id. at 609.
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[In 2009,] the [receiver] in Pontiac, Michigan sold the disused
Pontiac Silverdome (which cost $55 million to build) for $580,000
to a Toronto-based company—a “firesale” price reflecting the
depths of the recession, but money that the [receiver] said was
necessary to relieve the city of maintenance costs. That price
was a stunning fall from the $20 million allegedly offered by a
minority-owned, Michigan-based company several years be-
fore.... The very same receiver then joined the buyer’s company
after leaving the [receiver] post.357
2. Restructuring Control Boards and the Center Point
Alternatively, a restructuring control board is somewhere in the
middle of the spectrum and represents the best course. By establish-
ing a board, traditional political forces that have shaped a municipal-
ity’s problems will be less influential.358 The board is to act in the
best interests of the municipality and its residents—which include
current and future residents—as well as key creditor constituen-
cies. The board should be free to take action that is politically
unpopular in order to increase the likelihood that the municipality
will enjoy sustainable viability. Theoretically, the board attempts to
preserve local democracy by giving residents a voice through elected
state and local officials who either directly participate in the board’s
decision-making processes or select board members who will be di-
recting board action. A diffused decision-making structure makes
the board less susceptible to capture and self-dealing. A state can
opt to support local autonomy further by instructing the board to
macromanage the municipality. More specifically, the board can be
tasked with making key policy decisions regarding the municipal-
ity’s borrowing, taxing, and contract modification architecture. The
board would establish the overarching construct, and local officials
would be allowed to make certain decisions within the board’s para-
meters.
My state debt adjustment mechanism affords the board a broad
grant of power, though the board may choose to take a conservative
approach in utilizing its arsenal. Primarily, the board should be
357. See id. (footnotes omitted). 
358. See Cyr, supra note 103, at 23.
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allowed to conduct all aspects of municipal operations through
majority vote.359 These options include effectuating debt service,
making necessary contributions to pension funds, managing tax
policy,360 hiring and removing municipal employees, seeking ad-
ditional financing,361 exercising the authority of local officials, and
restructuring municipal offices, departments, and agencies. The
board will have the discretion to formulate an optimal delegation
structure. The board would be bound by state law but could request
that the state legislature waive certain restrictions if such a waiver
process exists under state law. The board’s ultimate goal would be
to develop a recovery plan and new operating budget that restruc-
tures the municipality’s expenses and obligations to ensure sus-
tainable viability. As part of this process, the board should manage
all creditor negotiations and enjoy subpoena power as well as the
power to review municipal records and bookkeeping.362
The board should be composed of an odd number of members,
somewhere between five and eleven. Ideally, the board would be a
collective of (1) local and state officials or individuals appointed by
such officials, including city and state comptrollers, (2) a retired
359. I believe that a simple majority is appropriate to authorize action. A model premised
on a super-majority or unanimous vote would almost certainly encounter paralysis. 
360. Ten states already give state interveners the ability to increase existing taxes and fees
or implement new ones. See STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 19.
361. One of the board’s primary directives is to maintain access to the credit markets for
the municipality. The board must act quickly to ensure that the municipality is not shut out
of the credit markets. New York City was shut out in 1975 and only regained partial access
to the long-term bond market in 1981. See SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 141-42. The city did not
obtain investment grade ratings for its notes and bonds until 1983. See id.
362. The state statute should not provide that the board is given the power to unilaterally
modify, reject, or terminate municipal contracts. A statute that contains this type of provision
would invariably face a preemptive constitutional challenge. For example, in March 2013, the
Michigan state legislature passed the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act (LFSCA),
which granted an appointed emergency manager the power to unilaterally modify municipal
contracts. The LFSCA was immediately challenged as violating the state and federal Consti-
tutions. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, Phillips v. Synder, No. 2:13-
cv-11370-GCS-RSW (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2013). By not explicitly conferring this rejection
power, the state should be able to insulate the statute from a preemptive attack by unions and
creditors. As noted above, an effective restructuring mechanism does not need to create uni-
lateral contract modification options for municipal or state officials. But the system does need
to acknowledge that such options may exist under applicable state and federal law and should
empower restructuring officials to use these options if necessary. The state statute must allow
the board to act on behalf of the municipality and undertake such unilateral actions that are
permitted under state and federal law.
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jurist or legal academic, and (3) unelected individuals from the pri-
vate sector selected by the governor.363 The inclusion of current or
retired heads of corporations, and executives at prominent local and
state businesses will give the board credibility within the lender and
bondholder communities. This composition attempts to support the
fidelity of the local democracy while ensuring that perverse political
incentives and cost shifting are minimized in developing meaningful
restructuring practices.
D. Stage Four: A Clear Negotiation Structure and Contract
Modification
Distressed municipalities cannot simply rely on budgetary cuts in
order to achieve sustainable viability.364 Significant relief from ex-
isting debt obligations is necessary. Consequently, as noted above,
a clear negotiation structure is my proposal’s primary contribution.
Within this structure, the board will be empowered to lead settle-
ment discussions with key creditors, though it may choose to dele-
gate these duties in some cases. As noted above, the ultimate goal
of these negotiations is consensual modification of key contracts and
363. One initial hurdle is securing the participation of successful private sector individuals.
But this may not be the insurmountable obstacle many would suspect. In 2008, the Obama
administration organized the Automotive Task Force (ATF) to develop a reorganization plan
for General Motors and Chrysler. See STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT
OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 20, 46 (2010).
The ATF was composed of a mix of automotive experts, attorneys, and private sector finance
and restructuring professionals. Steven Rattner headed the ATF. At the time, Rattner was
the managing principal for Quadrangle Group, a private investment firm that had more than
$6 billion of assets under management. Needless to say, Rattner accepted a staggering pay
cut in order to head the ATF. Rattner described his decision to accept the low-pay, high-stress
position as follows:
Our country was facing the greatest financial and economic crisis since the
Great Depression; when would the skills of a finance guy like me possibly be
more useful? If I hung back this time, what would I be saving myself for? ... I
was on the verge of the experience of a lifetime. I was being given a chance to
play a central role in the largest industrial restructuring in history from within
the most powerful institution in the world.
Id. at 5, 13. States would need to approach private sector professionals from this angle. The
service would certainly be grueling, and remuneration would be far less than these pro-
fessionals customarily receive. However, these individuals would have the opportunity to set
policy and effectuate meaningful change during desperate times for a municipality. The ex-
perience would be supremely challenging and uniquely rewarding.
364. See Chung, supra note 39, at 816.
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debt obligations. My debt adjustment mechanism attempts to
identify municipalities before crisis and at a time where radical
concessions are not necessary. The board will be tasked with propos-
ing modifications and accepting or rejecting settlement offers.365
Neither the state legislature nor state officials should be allowed to
occupy a blocking position or hold veto power. This is another com-
ponent that reduces creditor holdout risk.
The board and its professionals will begin by quantifying the fixed
cost relief necessary to stabilize the municipality. In effectuating
debt relief, these officials will seek consensual contractual modifica-
tions from key creditor groups. These proposals will be premised on
the nuanced understanding of the Contracts Clause detailed earlier
in this Article.366 The bulk of this relief will come from bondholders
and employees. My system is premised on a shared burden among
all creditor constituencies and seeks to capture distressed munici-
palities at a time where less sweeping concessions will be sufficient.
Bondholders and employee unions both fear that their group will
bear a grossly disproportionate financial burden from a restructur-
ing. My mechanism’s shared-burden principle reduces the conces-
sions any one group is forced to make, creating a more palatable
process.367
Naturally, drawing creditors to the negotiating table can be diffi-
cult but, as explained above, my debt adjustment mechanism offers
enough carrots and sticks to minimize disengagement risk. Negotia-
tions should follow customary out-of-court restructuring discussions
that characterize corporate reorganizations. The municipality or the
state should cover key creditor constituencies’ reasonable profes-
sional fees related to the negotiation.
Most importantly, my mechanism provides a limited ninety-day
negotiation period with one thirty-day forbearance period that can
365. Each state would have to determine whether negotiations would be conducted by a
neutral mediator, legal counsel for the board, or some other board representative. The cus-
tomary practice in out-of-court business restructurings is for legal counsel to lead the nego-
tiations. 
366. See supra Part III.C.
367. I acknowledge that there will be scenarios where bondholders find means to insulate
themselves and ostensibly force union employees to bear a disproportionately large burden.
In such cases, the municipality may have no choice but to pursue a Chapter 9 filing. As noted
throughout this paper, my proposal does not eliminate the Chapter 9 option from the distres-
sed municipal landscape. 
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be invoked by any contract party. After that, the board must vote to
either (1) pursue unilateral contract modification in order to gain
concessions essential to sustainable viability or (2) file a Chapter 9
petition on the municipality’s behalf. This rigid timeline will spur
dynamic negotiations.
1. Negotiating with Bondholders
There exist permutations among types of municipal debt, but
bonds can generally be classified as being either “general obligation”
or “revenue.” General obligation bonds (“GO Bonds”) represent un-
secured debt that is backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing
municipality and payable from the general funds of the issuer.368
“[T]he precise source and priority of payment ... may vary consider-
ably from issuer to issuer.”369 Almost all municipalities rely on GO
Bonds to fund daily operations and capital projects.370 Local govern-
ment GO Bonds are payable from the issuer’s ad valorem taxes.371
GO Bonds issued by states are serviced by appropriations made by
the legislature.372
On the other hand, revenue bonds are bonds that are serviced by
payments or fees originating from the project the bonds financed.
These bonds are generally not backed by the municipality’s taxing
power, although there are exceptions.373 Revenue bonds have had a
higher default risk than GO Bonds because payments depend al-
most exclusively on the revenues generated from the project.374




370. See Brief by the Securities Industry, supra note 66, at 1.
371. See Sources of Repayment, supra note 368.
372. See id. 
373. Some revenue bonds are “double-barreled” bonds, with revenue shortfalls backed by
the issuer’s full faith and credit. See id.
374. Bondholders have limited enforcement powers under state law when dealing with a
defaulting municipal borrower. See SPIOTTO ET AL., supra note 102, at 42, 57 (appendix lists
each state’s protections). And contractual remedies may vary depending on bond provisions.
Bondholders’ real leverage comes from the prospect that a defaulting municipality will be
locked out of the credit markets or face borrowing costs that are so high as to ostensibly con-
stitute a lock out. In light of limited enforcement mechanisms, bondholders frequently obtain
payment protection including bond insurance, letters of credit, or a guarantee by another unit
of government. In the rare event that a municipality defaults on insured bonds, the insurer
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The scope of negotiations with bondholders is usually narrow.375
Bondholders are entitled to interest and principal payments on
the bonds they hold. Historically, distressed municipalities have
sought to defer or reduce interest payments while pushing back
maturity dates, essentially turning short-term obligations into long-
term obligations. Bondholders have ostensibly priced their debt to
account for the risk of default and are often represented by agents
that understand that debt restructuring is a natural part of lend-
ing.376 In fact, bondholders have acknowledged that, during times of
financial distress, their debt is subject to adjustment as to interest
rates and the timing of payments.377 However, the general rule is
that bondholders have not priced their debt to account for a reduc-
tion in principal because nonconsensual reductions of this nature
have not occurred in the municipal debt market.378
With this in mind, the board would initiate an out-of-court re-
structuring with bondholders by stressing some of the key objectives
of the applicable state debt adjustment mechanism. The board
would stress that the bondholders’ recovery is contingent on the
municipality enjoying sustained viability, which ensures payment
of the principal and interest. This invariably improves the munici-
pality’s credit rating, which facilitates reselling the municipality’s
debt in secondary markets. But under my mechanism, meaningful
becomes responsible for interest and principal payments. The insurer attempts to recover
from the defaulting municipality. Bondholder interests are often times pursued by insurers,
not the bondholders. See Matthew Dolan, A Bond Insurer Takes on Detroit, WALL ST. J., July
14, 2014, at C6. However, the Great Recession decimated the bond insurance industry. In
2005, 62% of long-term, fixed-rate municipal securities were insured. That figure dropped to
21% by 2008, 9% by 2009, and only 6% by 2010. See DOTY, supra note 134, at 105-06.
375. I acknowledge that general obligation bondholders and revenue bondholders may
receive slightly different treatment by the board, but this Section’s discussion captures the
overarching perspective on bondholder negotiations. 
376. See Brief by the Securities Industry, supra note 66, at 11. Holders of corporate bonds
regularly agree to restructure notes in order to stay out of bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Matt
Chiappardi, Caesars Reaches Deal to Refinance $155M in Debt, LAW360 (Aug. 12, 2014, 2:17
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/566421/caesars-reaches-deal-to-refinance-155m-in-debt
[http://perma.cc/6YZU-7553].
377. See Brief by the Securities Industry, supra note 66, at 11. 
378. See id. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park represents one of the few cases
in which a federal or state court allowed a municipality to exchange existing bonds for new
ones with lower interest rates and deferred maturity dates without unanimous bondholder
consent. See 316 U.S. 502, 512-16 (1942). But some courts have found certain modifications
of bonds not to constitute substantial impairment implicating the Contracts Clause. See S.C.
Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of S.C., 386 S.E.2d 775, 790 (S.C. 1989).
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concessions are necessary from all constituencies because state law
would prevent the state from offering any ex ante bailout or mate-
rial emergency funding.379 The board will potentially negotiate with
employee unions simultaneously and could make consensual
bondholder modifications contingent on the board receiving similar
concessions from all or some key employee unions. Ultimately, the
bondholders benefit from these consensual modifications and those
made by other creditor constituencies because the municipal
borrower is stabilized and thus far less likely to completely default.
The board could offer bondholders a choice between a package
involving some assortment of terms that reduce interest rates and
extend maturity dates or one that defers interest and principal pay-
ments for some period of time to allow the municipality temporary
debt relief. Ideally, the municipality would be in the initial stages
of distress and relatively incremental concessions will suffice. In
such cases, the board may be able to spur concessions by arguing
that the terms they seek are minor modifications that do not con-
stitute substantial impairment implicating the Contracts Clause.
Indeed, payment deferral is arguably built into interest rates
charged on debt.380 The local government bond market is populated
with informed buyers and multiple sellers, and the market should
fully price this risk.381 I believe it would be difficult for a bondhold-
er to argue that these types of modifications could not have been
anticipated at the time of contracting. However, even if the Con-
tracts Clause is implicated, the board could argue that an emer-
gency has been declared by the legislature,382 and that temporary
deferral of interest and principal payments is appropriately tailored
to address the emergency at hand and reasonable in light of the
emergency and concessions sought from other key constituencies.
Naturally, the goal of this line of argument is to spur bondholder
concessions and reach consensual agreements.
379. As explored below, my mechanism does contemplate intergovernmental aid as part
of the formal recovery plan. 
380. See Inman, supra note 72, at 62.
381. See id. 
382. As noted above, before reversing devolution and considering potential unilateral
contract modification, the state legislature should declare that the municipality is experi-
encing a fiscal emergency.
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2. Negotiating with Employee Unions
Negotiations with employee unions are usually more convolut-
ed than those with bondholders. As detailed above, the Contracts
Clause is not an absolute prohibition on unilateral contract modi-
fication, but the swath of exempt modifications to employee benefits
is narrow.
Discussions with employee unions will follow many of the key
tenets discussed as to bondholder negotiations. Most importantly,
both current and past employees are bound to the municipality, and
a financially viable municipality increases the likelihood that
employees will stay employed and/or receive benefits. However, the
board must be careful to seek only modifications that the state could
arguably impose without union consent. Negotiations of this nature
are inherently contentious, and overreaching can poison the well.
Navigating these landmines requires a clear delineation of what the
board is seeking to modify and those benefits that are sacrosanct.
The board has a number of options when considering a modifica-
tion of employee benefits. Generally, modifications affecting future
employees will engender little controversy. Unfortunately, munici-
pal savings from reducing compensation and benefits afforded to
future employees are inadequate to address a municipality’s finan-
cial distress in any meaningful way.383 The board usually will be
forced to seek concessions from employee unions that will affect both
current and retired employees, including possible wage reductions,
furloughs, layoffs, cost of living adjustments, contribution increases,
pension multiplier reductions, and retirement age increases.
a. Compensation and Benefits
Employees receive compensation for their services in the form
of current cash wages, benefits, and deferred compensation. While
wages and benefits are received at set intervals shortly after
services are rendered, deferred compensation involves payments
and benefits that accrue over the term of employment and vest
at some later date.384 Other benefits that accrue over the term of
383. See RAVITCH & VOLCKER, supra note 26, at 14-15.
384. See id. at 12-15.
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employment exist, including cost of living adjustments and health-
care benefits.385 The aggregate of these expenses represents a
municipality’s primary fixed costs.386 Consequently, legislatures
seeking to assist distressed municipalities regularly consider ways
to reduce or defer these expenses. Scholars have explored the pro-
priety of these measures at a granular level.387 And a host of courts
have offered differing perspectives.388 But one preeminent principle
has emerged from the academic literature and the judiciary that is
relevant to this Article: employees have a right to enjoy benefits
that have vested and accrued, but states have the power to modify
employee benefits and the pension system prospectively.389 Oddly,
state legislatures that have attempted to modify benefits have tried
to take away accrued benefits as opposed to focusing on prospective
benefits.390 This is the consequence of waiting until a crisis point
before attempting to address financial difficulties. Indeed, deferred
action is the precursor to aggressive action for the vast majority of
financially pressured municipalities. Not surprisingly, attempts to
retroactively modify employee benefits rarely succeed.391
385. See id. at 14.
386. See supra note 225.
387. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 29, at 27; Monahan, supra note 322, at 1031-32; Paul
Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 28
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 263, 263-300 (2011). 
388. See, e.g., Md. State Teachers Ass’n v. Hughes, 594 F.Supp. 1353, 1363 (D. Md. 1984);
Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 545-46 (Ariz. 1965); Betts v. Bd. of Admins. of the Pub. Emps.’
Ret. Sys., 582 P.2d 614, 617 (Cal. 1978); Police Pension and Relief Bd. of City and Cty. of
Denver v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 697 (Colo. 1959); Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trs., 464
A.2d 894, 895-96 (Del. 1983); Smith v. Bd. of Trs. of La. State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d
1100, 1106 (La. 2003); Sylvestre v. State, 214 N.W.2d 658, 666-67 (Minn. 1978); Nicholas v.
State, 992 P.2d 262, 264 (Nev. 2000); Baker v. Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718
P.2d 348, 351-52 (Okla. 1986); Hughes v. State, 838 P.2d 1018, 1029 (Or. 1992); Booth v. Sims,
456 S.E.2d 167, 181 (W.Va. 1994); see also Robertson v. Kulongoski, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1104 (D. Or. 2004).
389. See Buck, supra note 29, at 60-61.
390. See id. Mr. Buck has formulated an intriguing proposal regarding equitable proration
of benefit reductions. The equitable proration argument that follows is drawn from Mr. Buck’s
scholarship. 
391. See id. at 61; Whitney Cloud, Comment, State Pension Deficits, the Recession, and a
Modern View of the Contract Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 2199, 2202 (2011); see also Kaho’ohano-
hano v. State, 162 P.3d 696, 736 (Haw. 2007) (holding that a law decreasing the amount the
state had to invest for public retirees violated beneficiaries’ contractual rights); Nicholas, 992
P.2d at 264 (stating that, once vested and thereby contractual, the legislature cannot uni-
laterally modify contract rights); McKenna v. State Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 421 A.2d 1236, 1243 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1980) (tracing a history of invalidated retroactive pension modifications in
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Ultimately, as detailed below, the board should feel comfortable
seeking modification of prospective benefits. Assuming the modifica-
tions are narrowly tailored, the board would be able to argue that it
could unilaterally impose these modifications. The argument should
be persuasive and initiate discussion of an alternative consensual
modification between the parties. However, the initial challenge is
determining whether a modification affects prospective or retroac-
tive benefits. This analysis will unfold on a benefit-by-benefit basis
below.
b. Current Employee Concessions
Some municipalities experiencing fiscal emergencies have been
successful in unilaterally imposing temporary contract modifications
on current employees. Once the emergency has dissipated, benefits
generally rise and return to normal levels.392 The primary conces-
sions the board can seek are wage freezes, wage reductions, hiring
freezes, health care contribution increases, and furloughs—all on
a temporary basis. Courts have authorized these actions, and the
board would not be overreaching in seeking these concessions up-
front.393 The modifications would not be permanent, but would stay
in place as long as the municipality’s emergency situation persisted,
as determined by the board or any subsequent monitoring agency.
The municipality would most likely have to include a sunset provi-
sion that eliminated the modifications by a certain date.
The primary concern with temporary debt-relief measures is that
the municipality may be simply deferring its day of reckoning.
However, my debt adjustment system is designed to identify munic-
ipalities at an early stage of financial deterioration. Consequently,
less drastic measures should prove to be effective as long as all key
constituencies contribute to the reform efforts.
holding that an amendment to the statutory method for calculating the benefits of retired
judges violated the state’s contracts clause).
392. See SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 141-42; see also Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt.,
6 F.3d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 1993).
393. See, e.g., UAW v. Fortuno, 633 F.3d 37, 46 (1st Cir. 2011); Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v.
Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2006); Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1015; Teamsters
Local 97 v. State, 84 A.3d 989, 1010 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014); Subway-Surface
Supervisors Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 375 N.E.2d 384, 388 (N.Y. 1978).
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To the extent the debt relief from the concessions noted above is
proportionately insufficient, the board could consider more aggres-
sive proposals. For example, the board may propose a modification
of the pension multiplier for pension benefits.394 Assume that a
municipality is part of a state pension system that offers employees
a 4% multiplier in determining pension payments upon retirement.
Under such a system, an individual employed for twenty years
would be entitled to 80% of her final average salary per year for the
duration of her retirement. Imagine that a municipality becomes
subject to the state debt adjustment mechanism, and the board
proposes that the multiplier be reduced to 1%. An employee that has
worked for the municipality for ten years and is ten years away
from retirement would receive a prorated multiplier.395 This em-
ployee has accrued ten years of service at the 4% multiplier rate.
This benefit has vested and generally cannot be modified. However,
if this employee chooses to continue as a municipal employee for
another ten years until retirement, that service will accrue at a 1%
rate. This modification affects a prospective benefit that has not
vested. Assuming the employee continues working for another ten
years, upon retirement after twenty years of service this employee
would have a 2.5% multiplier rate,396 and she would be entitled to
50% of her final average salary per year for the duration of her re-
tirement.397 This is an example of separating a prospective modifica-
tion from a vested right.398
394. See Buck, supra note 29, at 61.
395. See id.
396. Ten years at a 4% multiplier and another ten years at a 1% multiplier averages out
to a 2.5% multiplier. Twenty years multiplied by 2.5% equals 50%. The board could make this
proposal more palatable by agreeing to consider an increase to the multiplier after a given
number of years.
397. Though this Article focuses on state law retirement benefits, federal Social Security
benefits provide an instructive point of reference. As explored by Professor Monahan, Social
Security benefits are noncontractual in nature and represent a property interest protected by
the Fifth Amendment. “As a result, potential Social Security recipients are entitled to pro-
cedural due process and are protected only against arbitrary government action ‘utterly
lacking in rational justification.’ Therefore, even ‘earned’ Social Security benefits can be re-
duced or revoked if such changes have a rational basis.” Monahan, supra note 322, at 1045-46
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)).
398. The board could take a more aggressive approach and ask employees to increase con-
tributions to their retirement accounts. In cases where employees do not already contribute,
the board could ask that employees begin contributing. This change will provide immediate
cash relief for the municipality. The board could also seek to increase the retirement age for
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c. Retiree Concessions
Retirees present a different problem. These former employees
have completed their service and are oftentimes in the process of
receiving accrued and fully vested benefits.399 Unilateral contractual
modifications are limited, which restricts consensual modification
proposals. But prospective modifications are available.
For example, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) represent the
primary avenue of debt relief. Many states use a formula to deter-
mine COLAs for retirees, but some states do not explicitly delineate
how the COLAs for retirees will be determined from year to year. In
these cases, COLAs arguably represent a prospective benefit and
unilateral modification of this term may be permissible. The board
could propose a reduction or elimination of COLAs for retirees dur-
ing the duration of the municipality’s distress period. Coupled with
this proposal, the board could also direct officials to more carefully
assess final average salary to ensure that employees are not re-
ceiving an artificially inflated number that leads to excess benefits
throughout retirement.
current employees. Note that these proposals are extremely aggressive, not necessarily within
the exception to the Contracts Clause, and may effectively end negotiations. 
399. A few states—including Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and
New York—have state constitutional provisions that provide that vested pension benefits can-
not be unilaterally modified or impaired, but the protection offered by such provisions is not
as sweeping as many employee unions would hope. See Monahan, supra note 322, at 1071-74;
see also ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXIX, § 1 (state case law is not entirely
clear on what protections the constitutional provision provides); HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 2
(interpreted by courts to protect pension benefits that have been earned but not retirement
benefits that have yet to be earned through services rendered); ILL. CONST., art. XIII, § 5; LA.
CONST. art. X, § 29; MICH. CONST., art. IX, § 24 (interpreted by courts to protect pension
benefits that have been earned but not retirement benefits that have yet to be earned through
services rendered); N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7; Kraus v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund of
Niles, 390 N.E. 2d 1281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Smith v. Bd. of Trs. of La. State Emps.’ Ret. Sys.,
851 So. 2d 1100, 1105-06 (La. 2003) (explaining that state constitution protects accrued
benefits of state public pension plan participation but holding that accrued benefits mean “in
the sense of due and payable; vested”); Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n, Local 1000 v. Regan, 525
N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1988); Lippman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 487
N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1985) (provision does not protect changes in employment conditions, or
changes to statutes or regulations that may incidentally have an adverse effect on benefits
payable upon retirement). Further, Professor Monahan has argued that states providing
robust contractual protection should revisit legal precedent and safeguard only those benefits
an employee has accrued through past service. See Monahan, supra note 322, at 1081-82.
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Ultimately, my debt adjustment mechanism is premised on early
detection, dynamic action, and consensual contract modifications
that seek relief from all key constituencies. This construct does
not contemplate dramatic reductions in employee benefits or bond-
holder obligations. In the event that the debt relief concessions
outlined above are insufficient, the board may have no alternative
but to authorize a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing. Municipalities re-
quiring sweeping changes must look to the federal bankruptcy
process.
E. Stage Five: Recovery Plan
As noted above, my mechanism provides a limited ninety-day
negotiation period with one additional thirty-day forbearance period
that any contract party can invoke. Ideally, at the end of formal ne-
gotiations, the board will have obtained the necessary concessions
and be in the process of formulating a recovery plan and new operat-
ing budget that will afford the municipality sustainable viability.
The board should be able to verify that it believes that the munici-
pality will not be subject to another stage three board appointment
for the next five years.400 This verification will minimize recidivism
risk.
The recovery plan must contain a plethora of information, includ-
ing the concessions received from each creditor constituency, the
means and timeline for implementation of the concessions, any
support the state or other governmental entities offer,401 municipal
assets that were sold or are to be sold, incurrence of new debt, treat-
ment of claims against the municipality, description of any sunset
provisions regarding the board’s disbandment, and which entity or
individuals will monitor the municipality to ensure consummation
of the plan. The board will also be tasked with formulating a new
operating budget with a five-year horizon based on the recovery
plan. A rehabilitated municipality will be subject to an extended
period of hard monitoring regardless of its financial position. The
400. Financial projections beyond five years are far too speculative. 
401. Under my system, additional intergovernmental aid is available only pursuant to a
formal recovery plan. Further, receipt of intergovernmental aid should be contingent on the
municipality properly following the directives found in the plan. 
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board can be permanently disbanded upon the municipality
achieving certain fiscal benchmarks.
However, if the board is unable to gain the necessary concessions
for the municipality’s sustainable viability, the board must pursue
one of two options. First, the board may seek unilateral modifica-
tion of municipal contracts in order to gain the concessions that
proved elusive in stage four creditor negotiations. Alternatively, if
the board believes that the temporary relief afforded by unilateral
modifications would still be insufficient or is unlikely to be upheld
if challenged, the board must vote to file a Chapter 9 petition on be-
half of the municipality. As noted above, my mechanism grants the
board this power, and neither the state legislature nor the governor
can halt it.
A negotiation process that culminates in a Chapter 9 filing could
arguably be construed as a failure. In such cases, the state devoted
resources to an out-of-court restructuring process that was unable
to successfully rehabilitate the municipality. However, I think this
assessment would be misguided. A municipality that matriculates
through my state debt adjustment mechanism but ultimately files
for Chapter 9 does so after an exploration of its key issues and with
a thorough understanding of necessary relief. This understanding
will promote a faster, less expensive Chapter 9 proceeding that is
more likely to yield optimal results.402 Further, as noted above, my
mechanism cannot assist all municipalities in distress. Federal
bankruptcy court is still the venue for the most troubled cases. My
system seeks to supplant Chapter 9 only as to a distinct—albeit
large—subset within the distressed municipality market.
402. We see this phenomenon in the corporate bankruptcy world. Companies participate
in out-of-court restructuring processes that are oftentimes not fruitful. However, these com-
panies are able to enter into federal bankruptcy court on the fast track to recovery. In some
cases, these companies have been able to resolve the vast majority of their problems and
emerge from bankruptcy within a matter of weeks. Mike Spector, Quickie Bankruptcy Filings:
Companies Zoom In, Zoom Out, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748704789404574636164199387026 [http://perma.cc/652U-QZCV].
The same benefits should inure to municipalities that complete extensive out-of-court
negotiations. See Henry C. Kevane, Deploying the “Prepackaged” Plan of Adjustments in
Chapter 9, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES 107, 118, 120, 130 (2011).
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V. CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTATION: RAMIFICATIONS TO
BORROWING COSTS
My proposed state debt adjustment mechanism is an ambitious
solution to an extremely pernicious problem. But there is one
significant consequence of implementation that must be addressed.
My mechanism increases the likelihood that municipalities will
be able to effectively reorganize their debt structure without re-
sorting to Chapter 9. However, a threat to bondholder interests is
inherent in these improved prospects for sustainable viability. My
mechanism creates a negotiation structure that affords municipali-
ties leverage they may not have attempted to exert otherwise and,
quite frankly, may never have even realized they had. One could
argue that municipalities within a state that enacts my debt adjust-
ment mechanism could face significantly higher borrowing costs
because their ability to reduce the value of bondholder claims has
been bolstered.403 In other words, with their newfound leverage,
municipalities may act competently and aggressively in addressing
their fiscal difficulties to the detriment of bondholder constituencies.
This newfound power may compel bondholders to demand higher
interest rates or additional protections to offset this risk. Despite
these valid concerns, I believe the likelihood of a significant increase
in borrowing costs is overstated.
Changes in borrowing costs are often captured by changes to a
borrower’s credit rating.404 The changes are not necessarily symmet-
rical, but credit ratings are certainly instructive. This is especially
true for institutional borrowers that have their financial architec-
ture inspected by an independent rating agency. Credit rating agen-
cies have uniformly endorsed states with intervention programs and
have explained that such programs—even those that have signifi-
cant practical limitations—improve the likelihood of sustainable
viability for municipalities.405 Bonds issued by states that have
403. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 578, 581-
82 (1998). 
404. See DOTY, supra note 134, at 39-41.
405. See LISA COLE, MOODY’S U.S. PUB. FIN., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS ISSUED BY U.S.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 14 (Oct. 2009), http://www.mysouthborough.com/wp-content/uploads/
2010/04/Moodys-GO-methodology-10-09.pdf [http://perma.cc/7MG9-LJBE].
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intervention programs have enjoyed higher credit ratings.406 Credit
rating agencies have also embraced comprehensive state monitoring
of municipalities.407 My debt adjustment mechanism provides for
comprehensive monitoring by the state. With the state in the pri-
mary monitoring role, many of the information asymmetries that
have plagued the municipal borrower market will be eliminated.408
This monitoring coupled with a comprehensive intervention pro-
gram will create more stable municipalities. Credit rating agencies
have embraced this premise and given states with strong monitor-
ing programs higher bond ratings.409
Further, my debt adjustment mechanism is not just proactive, but
also delineated. Consequently, the mechanism provides certainty
through a clear negotiation structure, timetables, and a circum-
scribed list of preferred concessions that does not accept opportunis-
tic defaults. Certainty has value. I believe that a state’s adoption of
my debt adjustment mechanism will have no material effect on
borrowing costs because the mechanism’s certainty—vis-à-vis the
uncertainty under almost all existing state systems—offsets the po-
tential impairment risk.410
Finally, as noted above, my system is premised on a shared bur-
den among all creditor constituencies and seeks to capture distres-
sed municipalities at a time when less sweeping concessions will be
sufficient. Bondholders and employee unions both fear that their
406. See id.
407. See id. at 11.
408. See DOTY, supra note 134, at 40-41 (explaining that rating agencies have historically
not been able to engage in the extensive independent due diligence expected of underwriters). 
409. Moody’s has stated that properly functioning state oversight programs ensure that
local governments are secure, which bolsters credit ratings for the state and its munic-
ipalities. See COLE, supra note 405, at 11, 14. More specifically, North Carolina has the most
aggressive state monitoring program in the country. See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 335,
at 3. As a result, all three credit rating agencies have given bonds issued by the state and its
municipalities the highest bond rating, specifically citing the state’s oversight and prudent
financial management. See STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 100, at 33.
410. See Michael Bradley et al., Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from
the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 295-98 (2010) (finding that the addition
of collective action clauses—which enable supermajority voting to change payment terms—in
sovereign bond indentures did not appear to increase sovereign borrowing costs); see also
Anne O. Krueger, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism—One Year Later (Dec. 10. 2002),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/121001.htm [http://perma.cc/V94R-3AVK] (ex-
plaining that the creation of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism could in fact reduce
country borrowing costs). 
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group will bear a grossly disproportionate financial burden from a
restructuring. My mechanism’s shared-burden principle reduces the
concessions any one group is forced to make, creating a more palat-
able process.
Ultimately, even if borrowing costs do increase, I believe the
increase will be relatively nominal. More importantly, I believe that
the effect on the municipality from a nominal increase in borrowing
costs would actually be positive. As detailed in Part III.A.2, incre-
mentally higher borrowing costs restrict overgrazing at the debt
commons, limit cost shifting, and minimize moral hazard.411 Local
officials will be inclined to internalize the costs and benefits of their
decisions, creating a more optimal municipal paradigm.
CONCLUSION
Municipalities face daunting fiscal challenges that threaten to
fundamentally undermine basic service delivery. Though the depths
of these problems have only recently been revealed, many munici-
palities face significant impairment.412 Academics and policymakers
have focused on Chapter 9 and present federal bankruptcy law as
the most viable solution. But Chapter 9’s flaws are numerous and
well-known. This Article envisions an entirely new model: a state-
law based adjustment system that seeks to identify pressured
municipalities at an early stage of deterioration and then shepherd
these municipalities through a dynamic negotiation process with an
eye toward avoiding resource-draining litigation. My proposal has
no parallel under existing state-law systems and offers systemic re-
habilitation at a time when a new approach is desperately needed.
411. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
412. See Chutchian, supra note 31.
